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One thing that ethics attempts to determine is the right way to live in order to attain 
human flourishing. Both Aristotelian and African ethics give us communitarian 
accounts of how flourishing is attained by individuals who are brought up to have the 
right sorts of character. I argue that there are significant similarities between the 
accounts of the formation of ethical character in Aristotelian and African ethics. I aim 
to show that through a critical comparison of these two accounts, an account of the 
kind of society required from human flourishing can be developed. This can then be 
used to critique a dominant view of human flourishing: that of contemporary 
individualism. 
First I set out the Aristotelian account showing how it depends on a certain conception 
of the nature of persons. Second, I explore the African account of ethics and ethical 
character and show how this account is based on a similar communitarian conception 
of the nature of persons. In both Aristotelian and African ethics, society and 
upbringing play a crucial role in the attainment of human flourishing. Thus, third, I 
examine in detail the kind of society required for the formation of ethical character 
according to Aristotelian and African ethics respectively. I argue that there are many 
fruitful structural similarities between the two accounts. Lastly, I use the work done in 
the third chapter, as well as the work of certain prominent communitarian theorists, to 
critique a contemporary individualist view of human flourishing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ethics attempts to determine, among other things, the proper relation of one person to 
another, in order to determine what counts as well being of the individual and 
community. It attempts to determine for us the right way to live so that we can attain 
human flourishing. I aim to show that true flourishing depends on the flourishing of 
the whole community and that individuals can only flourish in the truest sense of the 
term when each and every one of the members of the community flourishes. 
An individual who actively exercises reason properly achieves human flourishing, 
argues Aristotle. According to Aristotle, as essentially social beings, our capacity to 
reason can only be developed in society. Furthermore the proper exercise of reason, or 
human flourishing, can only be attained in the right kind of society, a society that 
encourages the virtuous life. The virtues are just those capacities that enable us to 
reason properly. These capacities to reason properly, or to live well, can only be 
realised if the individual is situated in a network of appropriate relationships. Aristotle 
argues that the virtues are acquired by teaching and habituation, or upbringing. I 
explore Aristotle's account in chapter one. 
Like Aristotelian ethics, African ethics is based on a particular account of the nature 
of persons. According to African ethics, we are essentially social beings. The African 
person is defined in relation to other human beings around her. The African 
conception of a person is enshrined in this Xhosa proverb "Muntu ungumuntu 
ngabantu" meaning "a person is a person through persons". In chapter two I show 
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how according to African ethics, or Ubuntu, human flourishing is only realised in a 
community. Ubuntu is based on the values of humanness, caring, sharing, respect, 
love, kindness, and compassioa A person of good character in African ethics is the 
one who embodies and practices all the values of Ubuntu. As with the Aristotelian 
account, African ethics holds that good an individual can only achieve the kind of 
character suited for a flourishing life if she is situated in a particular network of social 
relationships. 
The notion of the good life in Aristotle's ethics is structurally similar to the notion of 
the good life in traditional African society. The good life is lived and realised in the 
community. It is the community and family that are essential in the formation of 
ethical character that leads to human flourishing. In chapter three I explore the 
similarities between these two accounts with a particular focus on the kinds of 
relationships, and networks of relationships, required for the formation of ethical 
character and flourishing. 
The communitarian view that I develop in chapter three goes against at least one view 
of human flourishing dominant in our society, a view that can be labelled postmodern 
individualism. According to this view, the individual is completely autonomous of 
any community. She has no necessary affiliation to any communal, or universal, 
values. Her membership of a given community is not a constitutive attachment that 
she ought to be responsible to, or that establishes the foundation of her own 
flourishing. According to this view, the individual is free to construct her own moral 
meanings independent of the community. The postmodern individual believes that our 
hopes, desires, language, community, our solidarity are all contingent products of 
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chance and time. As such, they are free to be discarded or picked up at will. Emman 
Duffy writing about postmodernism says: 
This flattening of traditional markers and measures of value 
by the market has been matched and facilitated by another set 
of collapse, the evacuation of belief in objective value, which 
sometimes called postmodernism Sometimes posing as a 
form of liberation from imposed and oppressive hegemonies, 
the tyranny of other people's choices, postmodernism 
challenges the privileging one sort of experience over 
another... every thing is held to be as interesting (or 
uninteresting) as everything else, and even human nature 
itself is viewed as a contingent cultural artefact, to be shaped 
as we please and can. Indeed there is no such thing as innate 
human nature, no purpose to human activity other than 
purposes we our selves generate or devise, no objective 
criteria of right and wrong, no virtues necessarily pursued to 
ensure a proper human flourishing, no story underlying the 
myriad stories which make up the cacophony of human 
experience, but only autonomous self-defining choices...1 
One major assumption behind the postmodern view is that persons are not essentially 
social. I hope to show that any ethic that does not honour the basic principle that we 
are always and necessarily creatures living amongst others must be radically flawed. 
Radical, postmodern individualism has also crept in to the African community, a 
community originally and fundamentally known for its strong communitarianism. In 
the traditional African society, as mentioned above, a person is defined through her 
relationship to others. It is the communal values of Ubuntu that have always held 
African society together. Today, many Africans are attempting to live according to the 
ideals of western individualism at the expense of the values of Ubuntu. 
I hope to show that living according to postmodern ideals of individualism can never 
lead to human flourishing. This is because, as I argue in chapter four, postmodern, 
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individualist society cannot provide the kinds of networks of relationships necessary 
for the formation of ethical character, which are in turn necessary for flourishing. This 
kind of individualism fails I argue, following the work of prominent communitarian 
theorists, because it is based on a flawed conception of the nature of persons. 
I have chosen Aristotelian ethics as the starting point for investigating the kind of 
society required for human flourishing because, in contemporary philosophical 
debate, probably the most influential of any of these accounts is that of Aristotle. The 
Aristotelian approach puts human flourishing in the foreground in a way that other 
ethical approaches perhaps do not. More over, in recent years, Aristotelian ethics has 
generated many important contemporary debates and there has been a resurgence of 
interest in the virtue ethics, or character approach, to flourishing. 
My overarching aim, however, is not to further contemporary Aristotelian debate but 
to contribute to the African Renaissance. I hope to contribute to the current growing 
body of scholarship in African ethics by showing how African values can be 
explicated and understood with reference to the ideas of one of the greatest 
philosophers that ever lived, without losing what is unique to African ethics. I aim to 
show that African ethics has similar kinds of depth and resources for critique of 
postmodern individualism. If my research is successful, I hope it will contribute 
towards a call for a renewal, in our society, of African values based on Ubuntu. 
1 Emman Duffy, Talking about God, In Priests People, vol8/9, p. 312 
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CHAPTER 1 
Aristotle on Ethics and Ethical Character Formation. 
1.1. Introduction. 
In this chapter I will discuss the communitarian nature of Aristotle's ethics and how 
the formation of ethical character that leads to human flourishing is a communitarian 
activity. I intend not to critique Aristotle's account but to explore his notion of human 
flourishing, which is realised only in a certain kind of society. I will first discuss 
Aristotle's idea of ethics and the goal of ethics and human life, which is eudaimonia I 
will then discuss Aristotle's idea of human nature that shows that we are naturally 
meant to live the eudaimon or flourishing life. Finally, I will discuss the formation of 
ethical character in Aristotle's ethics with the view to show that when an individual 
acquires the virtues she will be equipped to live the flourishing life that is meant for 
essentially rational and social beings. 
1.2. Aristotle on Ethics. 
Aristotle holds that the main aim of ethics is to give an account of happiness and to 
help human beings to understand the conditions and circumstances that are ideal for 
the attainment of happiness, or human flourishing. He argues that this is what human 
beings desire above all else. According to Aristotle, the desire for happiness is our 
primary, desire. Thus, we study ethics in order to understand what it entails to live a 
good life and a good life for Aristotle is a happy life. 
Aristotle's ethics is teleological in nature in the sense that it attempts to examine the 
telos' of human existence in order to determine how human beings ought to live to 
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realise their potentiality. Human actions, he argues, all aim at an ultimate goal - and 
this ultimate goal is the realisation of human flourishing. For Aristotle, we reach an 
ideal state of our being when we live a happy, flourishing life. The good life is the 
peak of our development as persons as it is our potentialities actualised. It is implicit, 
then, that all our intentional, chosen actions and every stage of our human 
development should aim at the good life or human flourishing. Thus, for Aristotle, 
fundamentally we are ethical or good for the sake of the attainment and realisation of 
our primary desire, the desire for happiness or living a good life. We are ethical, or 
good, because we want to flourish. 
1.3. The Concept of Eudaimonia 
The good life for Aristotle is eudaimonia - a Greek word that is normally translated in 
English as total well-being, happiness or human flourishing. In discussing eudaimonia 
in the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that every art, science, action and choice 
seems to aim at some good or end. As there are many actions, arts, and sciences so 
their ends are also many. For instance, health is the end of medicine, ships of 
shipbuilding, victory is the end of wars, and wealth of economy. He further states that 
some goods are desired for their own sake such as health of our bodies, and there are 
goods that are desired for the sake of higher goods such as money, which is desired 
for pleasure. 
He argues that if there is no ultimate good, which we all desire, our list of desires will 
be endless, empty and vain so there must be an ultimate and chief good. This is not 
meant to be a knock down argument, however. Aristotle then claims that the opinions 
of the 'many and the wise' show that happiness is ultimate desire of all human beings, 
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although they disagree on what constitutes happiness. Eudaimonia is thus the ultimate 
goal of all human action. 
As J.L. Ackrill says, Aristotle argues that eudaimonia is not the result or outcome of 
lifetime's effort; it is not something to look forward to. It is a life, enjoyable and 
worthwhile all the way through". Eudaimonia is constituted by activities that are ends 
in themselves. Where there are many final ends (telea), eudaimonia is the most final, 
final without qualification. It is final and most sufficient. We value such things as 
pleasure and virtues for themselves; as ends in themselves, we also value them for the 
sake of eudaimonia where as nobody ever aims at eudaimonia for the sake of one of 
them. Eudaimonia is the most desirable sort of life, the life that contains all 
intrinsically worthwhile activities. Pedro Tabensky echoes the same point: 
... the eudaimon principle, the principle that life is lived for 
the sake of eudaimonia and for the sake of nothing else, is the 
basic structural feature of lives of persons... it means that 
lives of persons are defined in relation to the ethical ideal of 
living for the sake of eudaimonia... eudaimonia is the telos -
the goal or end of the lives of person."1 
Eudaimonia is not, Aristotle quickly shows, the life of pleasure or honour or wealth. 
Aristotle argues that wealth is a means to an end so it cannot be the ultimate good. 
The value of honour depends on those who bestow it than upon those who receive it, 
and the ultimate good cannot be secondary in this way. The life of pleasure cannot be 
the ultimate good for human being because beasts also share such a life. For Aristotle, 
eudaimonia is an activity that involves a whole human life. It is an activity, not a 
temporary state of feeling happy. To avoid the clouds over the meaning of eudaimonia 
as happiness some scholars have suggested that eudaimonia be translated as human 
flourishing. 
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1.4. Eudaimonia as Human Flourishing 
Tabensky examines the meaning of eudaimonia as human flourishing or as well-
being, as opposed to happiness"'. He says well-being is an appropriate translation of 
eudaimonia because the notion of well-being, like the notion of a good life, denotes a 
certain way of living and hence it implies a life in its totality. Thus the term well-
being reflects the idea of happiness that Aristotle refers to as eudaimonia; happiness 
that touches all aspects of human life. He says, however, the term well-being is not 
the perfect translation of eudaimonia as it does not denote the fact that for Aristotle, 
happiness is a kind of complex human activity that is in conformity with virtue. 
Analysing the term flourishing, Tabensky argues that it is an appropriate translation of 
eudaimonia because it brings out other central features of the wordv. Flourishing is a 
botanical term that denotes not only activity, but also an activity in a particular 
directioa It denotes a development. A seed develops and matures into a healthy plant. 
Tabensky argues that flourishing denotes that there is a peak of development in a 
particular direction; this peak of development reflects what Aristotle refers as the telos 
of a developing thing. Moreover, a plant is flourishing when all parts of it grow and 
flourish as a whole, not at the expense of other parts. Human flourishing, like the 
flourishing of plant, should involve the complete manifestation and full exercise of 
the potentialities that characterise us as human beings. The flourishing of a human life 
does not mean flourishing of one aspect of the life; it is the flourishing of all aspects 
of a life including family, social, political, ethical, economical, emotional, intellectual 
and spiritual aspects. 
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For a seed to grow and mature into a flourishing plant, the external conditions must be 
ideal, that is, conducive to growth. The elements that affect the seed's growth must be 
perfect for it to reach its potential. Similarly, the flourishing of a human being should 
not be separated from the external conditions that affect that human being's life. 
Hence, for a person to reach her telos of existence or peak of development, which is 
eudaimonia external conditions must be appropriately conducive. For instance, a 
person needs, according to Aristotle, virtuous friendships in an ideal community, not 
just any type of friendship, in order to achieve the eudaimon life. 
Tabensky concludes his analysis by saying that eudaimonia can be understood 
appropriately as happiness, well-being or flourishing depending on what aspects of 
eudaimonia one wants to stress extensively". I will use the term flourishing as the 
translation of eudaimonia The reasons for my choice are two. The first comes from 
The Nicomachean Ethics, Book X where Aristotle claims that eudaimonia is an 
activity and not a state. "...Happiness is not a state; for if it were it might belong to 
someone who was asleep throughout his life, living the life of plant, or, again, to 
someone who was suffering the greatest misfortunes... we must rather class happiness 
as an activity..."1" It is an activity in the sense that it entails the individual working 
in a certain direction through her life; work that involves making rational choices and 
performing rational actions that lead to the realisation of the telos of her existence -
the eudaimon life. The second reason for choosing flourishing as the appropriate 
translation of eudaimonia is reflected in the title of my thesis. I am interested in 
exploring the external factors essential for eudaimonia This makes the botanical 
analogy appropriate and, thus, the translation of eudaimonia that is appropriate is 
flourishing. 
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1.5. Human Nature. 
Aristotle bases his account of eudaimonia on an account of human nature. He argues 
that human beings have a function or essence (ergon). Aristotle argues that this 
function is rationality. Aristotle also argues that human beings are by nature social, or 
political, as well as rational. 
He holds that the ultimate good for human being, flourishing, can be discovered by 
investigating the ergon or function of human beings. An ergon or function is not a 
task assigned to a human being from without. The function of a human being is that 
thing which, if it were lacking, would mean that that being would not be human. It is 
that which differentiates human beings from plants and animals. A human being is 
defined by her function as the sculptor is defined by her function of sculpting/111 
A human being has function but not in the instrumental sense as inanimate objects 
have a function. Inanimate objects have instrumental functions; which presupposes 
that they are good or useful for further ends or purposes. For instance, the purpose of 
knife is for cutting things. The function of human being, however, is that which is 
intrinsically or non-instrumentally beneficial for human being in virtue of her being a 
member of human species. Another way to understand this is to understand Aristotle 
as arguing that human beings have an essence. 
What is the function or ergon of human being? What is her essence? Aristotle answers 
these questions as follows: We are looking for something that is distinctive to human 
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beings. Life belongs also to plants. Plants grow, feed and reproduce as do human 
beings. Could our essence be perception? Perhaps, but this is shared by the horse, the 
ox and every animal. We are seeking something that is unique to us. What else 
remains? The only thing that remains that distinguishes us from plants and animals is 
the active life of the element that has a rational principle. So the ergon or function of 
human beings, Aristotle concludes, is the activity of soul or psyche in accordance 
with reason. Aristotle holds, in other words, that the life activities that we share with 
animals and plants - nourishing ourselves, growing, reproducing and perceiving, are 
no part of the essential characteristic activity of human beings. We could have a 
distinctively human life without these of growth, reproduction, perception and 
nourishment, thus the good life for human beings could not necessarily involve these 
activities. 
But just what is the link between our function and our living a good life? Aristotle 
holds that where a thing has a function a good member of that kind is one that 
performs that function well. Thus if the function of a sculptor is to sculpt statues, a 
good sculptor is not the one who sculpts statues anyhow but one who sculpts statues 
properly. As the function of human being is to actively exercise reason, an individual 
who actively exercises reason properly achieves eudaimonia Thus, if an individual 
functions properly she lives the life that is appropriate for her, in other words, the 
flourishing life. 
According to Aristotle, human beings differ from animals in their desire for the good, 
or eudaimonia A desire for something good is a rational desire formed by rational 
reflection on the benefits of different options. It is the essential feature of the human 
12 
soul - the concept of the final good applies to rational beings' desires. Someone who 
can compare different options must have a conception of the final good, one that will 
be promoted by the pursuit of one over another. The desire for the final good is thus 
part of the human function: part of what it is to be an essentially rational being is to be 
the kind of being who desires to live a eudaimon, flourishing life. 
Aristotle argues that human beings are teleologically oriented. Their existence is 
orientated towards a telos, or purpose. Another way to explain this, according to 
Aristotle, is that the final cause of a thing is what that thing is for - the end for which 
it exists. The final cause for Aristotle is what is good for that organism. The formal 
cause is that capacity which enables that thing to engage in that activity that is 
constitutive of its final end. The formal cause and the final cause are, in a sense, inter-
defined. The set of capacities or characteristics peculiar to human beings that 
constitute human essence, or function, thus determine in a sense, what is good for 
human beings. The essence of a natural kind determines what is beneficial for 
members of that kind. As the exercise of some capacities such as photosynthesis is 
essential for a plant and its welfare so there is an exercise of set of capacities or 
characteristics that is essentially human and is essentially related to human 
flourishing. 
Eudaimonia, our telos and our final cause, is thus simply the living well of essentially 
rational animals. Hence, human flourishing consists of a life that fully realises the 
potential to exercise reasoa 
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The function of human being is living according to reason, or at least, Aristotle adds, 
not without reason. It is said this addition is significant in that although an excellent 
human life is a rational one, excellence is not limited to purely intellectual activities. 
There is part of the soul that pertains to political, physical and social aspects of our 
lives as well and these excellences that pertain to this part of our lives are called moral 
virtues. A moral virtue in the strict sense is the disposition to make excellent, in other 
words fully rational, choices. It is the practical rational activity that we engage in 
when we deal with ethical problems and think about how we should live. 
Contemplative rational activity is rational in the strict sense, that is, rational in itself. 
Thus, Eudaimonia in the primary sense is contemplative rational activity whereas in 
the secondary sense it is would be practical rational activity or practical wisdom. It is 
moral virtue or practical wisdom that is required in the political and social aspects of 
our lives. 
It is Aristotle's claim that our rational nature can only be properly developed in a 
social context. Aristotle argues that human beings are by nature social and political 
animals1". Society provides the individual with the environment to exercise her 
rationality through communication and the practice of virtue. I will be discussing this 
point fully in chapter three. Although Aristotle says that the eudaimon life is a self-
sufficient life, he sees the term 'self-sufficient' to be communitarian in nature and this 
attests to the fact that human being is by nature a political animal: "By self sufficiency 
I mean not for the person himself leading a solitary life, but for the person along with 
parents and children and a wife and in general his friends and fellow citizens, since 
the human being is by nature a political animal.x" Ian Johnston interpreting Aristotle's 
idea of human being as a political animal says: 
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Human beings, in other words, derive their identity, their 
sense of self and thus their moral purpose from their 
participation in an existing community, the world of parents, 
ancestors, friends, customs, institutions and laws. In a 
tradition that goes back at least as far as Homer, Aristotle has 
no room for the notion that there is an individual existence 
prior to and independent of the community. Thus whatever 
ethical inquiry involves, it must take into account the essential 
and political basis of human life*1. 
Aristotle's notion of human beings as essentially social comes into prominence in his 
idea of the structure of state. He holds that the family as an association of parents and 
children is the association that is naturally established for the supply of human beings' 
everyday needs. When several families come together they form a village, that is, the 
first society. And when several villages unite they form a community. However, if the 
community is big enough to be able to cater for its own needs, that is the needs of its 
people, then the state comes into existence for the sake of good life for its members. 
Aristotle concludes his argument by saying that it is then very clear that it is human 
nature that gives rise to state. Hence, man is by nature a political animal. Any human 
being without a state, through nature and not through luck, he argues, is either less 
than or greater than a human being. She cannot be human being like us for the fact she 
lacks relationships with and concern for others - these things are definitive of human 
life 
Aristotle argues too that the fact that human being is endowed with the gift of speech 
shows that human beings are by nature socialx". The gift of speech denotes the 
relevance of the social in our lives for it shows the desire of a human being to be in 
communication. Thus human beings are naturally bound to exist in relationship to 
others, and our practices can only be purposeful within the context of sociability. It is 
natural that we should live with each other. 
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As Martha Nausbaum says, "Aristotle thinks and acknowledges that any search for 
the good life must go on inside a context of relatedness.*1"" Crucially, Aristotle argues 
that, as essentially social beings, our capacity to reason can only be developed in 
society and we can only achieve human flourishing life as a communal effort. 
Aristotle's stance on our essentially social nature is very explicit in his ideas about 
friendship. He argues that friendship is a necessary condition for a distinctively 
human life, and that a particular kind of friendship is a necessary condition for a good 
human life: 
For without friends no one would choose to live though he had 
all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of 
office and of dominating power are thought to need friends 
most of all; for what is the use of such property without the 
opportunity of beneficence, what is exercised chiefly and in its 
most laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be 
guarded and preserved without friends.... And in poverty and 
in other misfortune men think friends are the only refuge... XIV 
For Aristotle, friendship arises out of our human nature; it is natural to us human 
beings and it pervades all the categories of our human life: 
Parents seem by nature to feel it for offspring and offspring 
for parents, not only among men but among birds and among 
most animals; it is felt mutually by members of the same 
race... we may even see in our travels how near and dear 
every man is to every other. Friendship seems to hold states 
together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for 
justice... when men are friends they have no need of justice 
while when they are just they need friendship as well.™ 
He holds that friendship, especially virtuous friendship, is a necessary condition for 
the attainment of eudaimonia. Virtuous friendship arises purely from a love and 
appreciation of another. It is not a relationship based on sexual pleasure or for the 
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material gain. It is love for the other for the sake of the other. That is to say that 
virtuous friendship is thus based upon a love of what is truly good. It accentuates the 
good in each person. 
He argues that the good person needs friends because friendship enables happiness. 
As earlier stated, the happy, flourishing life is not a passive life. It is a life full of 
activity. Friendship enables the good man to exhibit social virtues such as generosity, 
friendliness and mildness of temper. And where two good people become friends, 
each becomes a mirror for the other and at the same time they learn good character 
traits from each other. 
Martha C. Nussbaum in her article, Aristotle on human nature and the foundations of 
ethics"', discusses certain thought experiments that aim to establish that human beings 
are essentially social and rational, in support of Aristotle's project. The first, which 
aims to show the sociability of human beings, is a discussion of the myth of the 
Cyclopes. Odysseus encounters Cyclopes, anthropomorphic creatures who live in 
isolation from any form of community. They have no social relationships. They do 
not meet together to discuss their affairs and make decisions. They do not have 
communal laws and rules that govern their interaction with one another, and they do 
not care about each other. They do not know that if you receive a guest in your house, 
you should not devour him These creatures look like humans but they are not 
classified as humans. 
Nussbaum asks that we attempt to imagine living the life of Cyclopes. She argues that 
we cannot coherently imagine living a human life without the element of sociability. 
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Indeed, the act of participating in the evaluative exercise is already an affirmation of 
the social nature of human beings. We would not, indeed could not, choose to live like 
the Cyclopes who have no social bonds with one another, for the choice would be 
self-defeating - we would cease to be human. 
The second thought experiment, which Nussbaum takes from Plato, is focused on the 
role of practical reason in our life. The thought experiment takes the form of an 
argument between Socrates and the young Protarchus. Protarchus, a hedonist, strongly 
asserts that pleasure is the good for human beings while Socrates asserts that it is 
practical reason. However, the two both agree that the good life for human beings 
must be complete, sufficient and choice-worthy. 
Socrates asks Protarchus to imagine that he is living a life full of pleasures, but 
altogether bereft of reason and intellect. Protarchus replies that he would be very 
happy with such a life even if reasoning and thinking are completely omitted. Socrates 
then reminds him that omitting reasoning entails omitting from his life such things as 
the belief that he is enjoying himself, the memory of pleasure, and the ability to 
calculate for future pleasure. Consequently, says Socrates, Protarchus would not be 
living a life of a human being, but rather the life of a jellyfish. Socrates then asks 
Protarchus 'A life of this kind isn't choice-worthy for us, is it?' Protarchus replies, 
'Socrates, this argument has left me altogether speechless.' Nussbaum concludes that 
the claims of practical reason have been acknowledged. We cannot coherently choose 
a life without reason; such a choice would be self-defeating as it would cease to be a 
human life. 
18 
Human beings, as it has been seen, are essentially both rational and social. I will argue 
that a virtuous person cannot be virtuous or live virtuously unless she lives in a certain 
kind of relationship with and to others: it is only in a certain kind of network of 
relationships that rationality can be exercised properly. I will discuss the kind of 
society that is required for human flourishing in chapter three. Having discussed what 
it is to be a human being, we can now turn to what it is to be a good human being on 
Aristotle's account. 
1.6. The Concept of a Virtuous Person 
Virtues can be understood to be skills for living well. They are those capacities or 
dispositions of character that enable us to understand any situation we might find 
ourselves in and react rationally and positively in order to avoid extremes and 
excesses. In other words, the virtues are those capacities that enable us to live fully 
rationally. 
Aristotle defines virtue as: "a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a 
mean, that is, the mean relative to us; this being determined by a rational principle, 
and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it.™1" 
By calling virtue a state of character he informs us that it is not a feeling nor mere 
tendency to behave in certain ways. Thus we are neither good nor bad, nor praised nor 
blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling an emotion or an impulse. Virtue is a 
settled condition where a person is able to choose and act rightly in relation to any 
situation. 
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The mean with which virtue is concerned is not the arithmetic type but one that is 
determined by reasoning in relation to the situation in order to avoid excess and 
deficiency. The virtuous person chooses and acts between two extremes, says 
Aristotle, in an appropriate, rational way. Aristotle's virtuous person chooses and acts 
appropriately for the particular set of circumstances. For instance, recklessness and 
cowardice are two vices or extremes of the virtue of courage. A reckless person does 
not think to consider the risks involved before embarking on any dangerous action. 
She feels too little fear. A coward shies away from any dangerous action or situation 
even if the situation is potentially gainful and this gain outweighs the risk involved. 
She feels too much fear. The virtuous person, however, is aware that certain situations 
call for caution, and that sometimes the potential gain can outweigh any risks, thus 
making the action desirable. She will always correctly assess any situation and feel 
the appropriate amount of fear. 
Discussing what the particular virtues are, Tabensky says: 
Virtues are typically developed and called for in the context of 
our unique engagements with life. Of course, insofar as we are 
persons, there must be a substantial overlap between the 
different modes in which complete virtue is expressed, but 
making this claim is very different from claiming that there is 
such a thing as a list of virtues. What there is, instead, is a 
rational system of dispositions that constitutes our practical 
understanding of life, and this rational system is one that is 
adaptive - sensitive to the particularities of the unique 
circumstances within which our individual lives are played 
out**". 
However, there are generally accepted virtues such as generosity, justice, friendliness 
and temperance. These are states of character that are associated with relevant sets of 
rational beliefs and desires. The virtuous must to have true reasoning and correct 
desire if the choice of action is to be good. Every virtue is defined as such in relation 
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to a particular feeling and action, and each virtue is given by the mean in relation to 
that feeling and action. The virtuous individual will always choose the mean through 
appropriate practical reasoning, particularly the appropriate desires that come from 
having the correct, reasoned conception of the good. 
Thus virtues help human beings to perform their function well, the function being 
rational activity. If human beings perform their rational activity well they become 
virtuous. A virtuous person is a morally good, excellent person who acts and feels as 
she should in every situation. By acting always with practical reason, the virtuous will 
live a happy life, since the life of the excellent exercise of reason is the flourishing 
life. 
1.7.The Formation of Ethical Character. 
It is worth noting that Aristotle's discussion of the formation of character is bound up 
with his discussion of the study of ethics. Nonetheless, emphasis here is on his 
account of the formation of ethical character. 
Virtues do not arise by nature says Aristotle; they cannot come about unless others 
train the agent and the agent practices virtue. In other words, virtues are acquired by 
teaching and habituation. This attests to the communitarian nature of the individual 
and reflects the fact that human beings flourish in a community. 
Aristotle's account of the acquisition of virtue involves several stages of training or 
habituation that a person must go through if she is to acquire virtue. He emphasizes 
the importance of beginnings and the gradual development of good habits of feeling. 
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Thus morality develops in a sequence of stages with both cognitive and emotional 
dimensions. 
For Aristotle acquisition of virtues entails first grasping the 'that' and then the 'why.' 
These two stages can be further be explained and distinguished in the following way: 
A human being who knows by herself what to do, and why it is the right thing to do, 
is the person who has grasped the why. She is a person of practical wisdom endowed 
with the knowledge of what to do in the varied times and circumstances of life. The 
person who takes to heart sound advice learns the that and becomes the sort of person 
who can benefit wisely from Aristotle's teachings and lessons. 
These lessons are designed and ordained to give her a reasoned understanding of the 
why which explains and justifies the that which she already has or can get hold of*̂ . 
For someone who is acquiring virtue must begin from what is familiar. This is the 
reason why one should have been well brought up in good habits if one is going to 
listen to lectures about things noble and just, in general about social affairs. 
The That. 
There are at least two stages that the young person must go through in order to acquire 
the that. Firstly, the young person must learn that a certain type of behaviour is 
required in particular circumstances. This is learned from the parents, teachers and the 
others. For instance, I tell my son it is good to visit the sick because it gives them 
comfort. To have the knowledge of the that in this sense is merely to have requisite 
information. This knowledge of the that includes knowing what to do, when to do it, 
where to do it and how to do it, and why it should be done. The why is not in the 
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sense 'the why'. Here, it simply means having intellectual knowledge of the act or 
action should be done in the abstract sense. Or what might be called 'book 
knowledge'. 
The next stage of knowing the that is knowing in the strong sense. This occurs when 
the agent enjoys the act properly - she enjoys the required act by doing it or putting it 
into practice by herself as opposed to doing it because others instruct her. She enjoys 
the act e.g. visiting the sick, because she appreciates what is in the act that is truly 
enjoyable. This later stage involves habituation or practice: practising the activity and 
coming to enjoy it. She is now true lover of noble and just action because she has 
acquired a taste for, or a capacity to enjoy things that are noble and just for their own 
sake. She has learned that they are noble and enjoyable for their own sake; however, 
she does not fully understand why they are so. She does not have a good man's 
unqualified knowledge or practical wisdom. She does however have the that which is 
the important starting point for acquiring practical wisdom and full virtue. She is 
someone who already wants and enjoys virtuous actions and wants to see this aspect 
of her life in a deeper perspective. 
The Why 
This last stage of the that which is appreciation of what it is about the action that is 
properly enjoyable is closely related to a further stage in the development and 
acquisition of virtue namely the stage at which it is grasped why the action is virtuous. 
This is the understanding of why she enjoys it. This involves both practical wisdom 
and intellectual knowledge. 
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The stage of habituation initially is to enable the young to grasp the that regarding to 
virtue. Once the stage is attained, the second stage becomes possible. The stage of the 
grasp of why as regard to virtue is necessary if the person is to have a reasoned 
understanding of virtuous action. This may involve both a full appreciation of why a 
particular act is required as virtuous in the relevant circumstances, and an ability to 
understand fully the relation between practical virtue and other concepts such as 
eudaimonia**. This is further highlighted in the fact that by the why of virtuous actions 
the person understands what makes actions noble, just, or courageous for example, 
and how they fit into a scheme of the good life. 
Aristotle makes it a condition of virtue that a virtuous action be chosen for its own 
sake. Choice, which is reached by deliberation from a conception of the good, 
includes a desire for the objects of virtuous action as good in themselves as well as 
noble and pleasant. The choice of virtuous actions should proceed from a firm and 
unchangeable character. Taking pleasure in doing virtuous acts is a sign that the 
virtuous dispositions have been acquired. 
A person becomes virtuous, then, by following Aristotle's two stage acquisition 
processes. Thus, training, habituation and practical reasoning are essential to 
becoming virtuous. Since moral virtue is about desiring the appropriate things, that is, 
feeling pleasure and pain appropriately, a person ought to have been brought up in a 
particular way so as to delight in and to be pained by the things she ought to be. For 
Aristotle, a virtuous person tends to do what is best with regard to pleasure and pains, 
and the vicious person does the contrary. Individuals are taught to feel pleasure and 
pain appropriately though upbringing and habituation. Thus, a person becomes 
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virtuous by doing virtuous actions. For the person who has acquired the virtues of 
temperance and courage, nothing will tempt her so much as the temperate or brave 
action itself; nothing else will seem as pleasurable. 
Having considered the communitarian nature of Aristotle ethics and its formation of 
ethical character that is a communitarian process, I shall consider in the next chapter 
the communitarian structure of African ethics and its communitarian approach to the 
formation of ethical character. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Ubuntu: The Communitarian Nature of African Ethics. 
2.1. Introduction. 
In this chapter I will discuss the communitarian nature of African ethics, commonly 
called Ubuntu. This is a conception of ethics founded on African metaphysics, 
particularly the African conception of the nature of persons. I will also discuss here 
the concept of a good person in African ethics and how an individual is trained to 
become a good person in African society. I do not intend to critique African ethics or 
its metaphysical foundations but rather to explore its communitarian, or social, nature. 
It is worth noting here that by African ethics I mean the ethics of traditional African 
society. 
Africa is a vast continent with many different cultures, and institutions like religion 
and politics differ from one culture to another. However, when I say Africa, I mean 
sub-Saharan Africa No matter what the political, religious and economic differences 
might be, it is generally agreed that the sub-Saharan African communities share the 
concept of life called Ubuntu - a life lived in a community: a life of sharing, 
friendliness and generosity whereby values such as truthfulness and respect for elders 
are upheld and encouraged. Ubuntu is founded on the notion that there is a 
fundamental connection between the welfare of the individual and the welfare of the 
group. 
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Before I discuss African ethics in detail, I examine the metaphysics upon which 
African ethics is based. I discuss the Yoruba, Akan, and Bantu's conceptions of the 
person, and I hope to show that although the details of the philosophical view of the 
person may differ from one culture to another, they have one thing in common which 
is that the person is defined by her context of relatedness to others. This, I hope, will 
give insight into the communitarian nature of African ethics. 
2.2. African Metaphysics. 
African metaphysics, like western metaphysics, deals with fundamental questions of 
existence and reality; questions about, for example, the universe, God, the person, and 
space and time. The dominant view of reality in African metaphysics is that it is 
dualist in nature. That is to say, reality is consists of both invisible and visible 
aspects, or immaterial and material aspects. These two aspects interact together and 
are interdependent. Barnabas C. Okolo in his article 'SelfAs A Problem" maintains 
that this view of reality can be likened to that of the Platonic tradition in western 
philosophy. 
Unlike the instantiated world in Plato's theory of reality, however, in African 
metaphysics the experienced world is viewed as real, and not as a mere shadow of the 
true world. According to African ontology, God, the ancestors and spirits dwell in the 
invisible or immaterial universe while human beings, animals, plants and non-living 
things dwell in the material, or experienced, universe. 
For the Bantu people, for example, there is a hierarchy of beings called forces. God 
comes first in this hierarchy, followed by the first fathers of men, then the dead, 
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addressed today as the living dead. In the visible universe a hierarchy is also in place. 
Human beings come first followed by animals, vegetables and minerals. However, the 
two orders of the universe or existences relate to and interact with each other. There is 
interrelationship between God, the dead, the living and nature. As Okolo notes, the 
living dead, or the ancestors, are part and parcel of physically living families and 
often invited to family meals. They are believed and felt to be still present, protecting 
and guiding the household, directly concerned in all the affairs of the family and 
property, giving abundant harvests and fertility. Thus it is to be noted that 'dynamic' 
rather than 'static' is a primary concept useful for understanding and appreciating the 
African view of the relation between visible and invisible reality. 
Okolo believes that African metaphysics differs greatly from that of Aristotle, in that 
Aristotle upholds that there are individuated, discrete existences: substances existing 
in and by themselves. African metaphysics is also obviously different from 
naturalistic metaphysics, which maintains only one kind of reality in nature, namely, 
the experienced nature. Nature for them is monistic, without any radical divisions. By 
contrast, the African ontology maintains the existence of both the spirit world and the 
material universe, both interacting with the other. 
J. M. Nyassa attests to the interrelationship between the invisible world and the 
visible world of the African persons whereby the ancestors are constantly watching 
over the living: 
... Their world is characterised by an extended psychosomatic 
relationship whereby the body (the living) must interact with 
the 'non-living' (the spirits of the ancestors). Thus life seems 
to be interpreted monistirically and in a manner according to 
which reality (the being with life force) is continuously 
rendered dynamic and self-regenerating and whereby it 
i 
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generates gratuitous values of mutual concern, mutual 
sustenance and mutual harmony". 
It is worth noting that in African philosophy it is not easy to separate or 
compartmentalize metaphysics from social theory or morality as they are 
interconnected. A metaphysical discourse may appear as a political or moral 
discourse. According to L .J. Teffo: "African metaphysical thinking (is) social in 
nature... It is difficult to distinguish metaphysics, social theory or morality in African 
thinking because all philosophising is communitarian in nature"1". Indeed, as we shall 
see later, full personhood is only reached in a community by following the ethical 
norms of that community. 
W. Abraham seems to support this view when he says: 
According to the Akan's metaphysical view, the world is 
rationalist philosophical. Relations between ideas take on 
body and flesh in the relations between things in nature. 
According to such view, true metaphysics must be deductive 
system. And morality, politics, medicine, all is made to flow 
from metaphysics"'. 
Having considered briefly the African view of reality, I now discuss the African 
concept of a person. African ethics is based on a particular account of the nature of 
persons. In this discussion we can see more clearly the relation between metaphysics 
and ethics in African philosophy. 
2.3. The African Concept of a Person. 
I noted above that the dominant African view of reality that it is a composite of two 
parts namely the visible and invisible, or material and immaterial worlds. Similarly, 
the metaphysical concept of the nature of persons is dualist. On this view, a person is 
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made up of two principal substances, one spiritual and the other physical. Moreover, 
these two substances are not separate or distinct. As with the African view of reality, 
these two substances are interdependent and interact with each other. Teffo et.al 
write: 
Although there are differences with reference to the 
constituting parts of a person, there is agreement that the 
person consists basically of a material aspect and a 'spiritual' 
aspect or aspects... (But) these spiritual entities have material 
qualities; there is no radical or categorical difference between 
the spiritual and the material". 
This can be observed in the Yoruba conception of a person. Segun Gbadegesin, a 
Yoruba from South West Nigeria in his book African philosophy: Traditional Yoruba 
Philosophy and Contemporary African Realities, enumerates four principal 
components of Eniyan, the person, as Ara (body), Okan (heart), Emi (spirit) and Ori 
(head). He writes: 
These components may be grouped into two: physico-material 
and mental-spiritual. Ara belongs to the first, emi to the 
second, and Ori and Okan have physical and mental aspects. 
Second, a mentalistic conception of Okan is postulated to 
account for the phenomenon of thought...Third, ori is also 
postulated as a spiritual entity (in addition to its meaning as 
physical head) to account for the phenomenon of destiny. 
Even when Okan is postulated to account for the phenomenon 
thought, what ever, it has to do with this and with to emotional 
state of a person cannot be separated from the Ori as the 
bearer of her destiny. Therefore, Okan, as source of conscious 
thought and emotions, could be regarded as a subsequent 
(post-natal) expression of destiny/portion pre-natally in the 
Ori...Okan as the source of the post-natal consciousness and 
emotions, therefore only reflects that which had been encased 
in Ori originally ..." 
The indistinctness and interrelationship of the constituting parts in the Yoruba 
conception of persons can also be observed in the Akan conception. The Akan are a 
populous Ghanaian tribe. Kwame Gyekye says in his book An Essay on African 
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Philosophy Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme"", that in Akan thought a person 
is composed of immaterial (spiritual) and material substances namely Okra (soul), 
sensum (spirit) and honam (body), but the Akanians sometimes speak as if the 
relation between the soul and the body is so close that they compose an indissoluble, 
indivisible unity, and that consequently a person is a homogeneous entity. He 
maintains too that Akan thinkers take an interactionist view of the relation between 
soul and body. They hold that not only does the body have a casual influence on the 
soul but also that the soul has a casual influence on the body. What happens to the 
soul takes effect or reflects on the condition of the body, and vice versa. This 
interactional relationship between different components of a person, especially 
between the soul and body, is also found between the visible and invisible worlds, as 
noted above. 
The concept of person might differ in detail from one particular sub-Saharan culture 
to another but there is a strong underlying similarity in the view of the way the 
individual is defined by her capacity to relate and interact with others in the visible 
and invisible world external to her. In the Bantu view, unlike the dualist Yoruba and 
Akan views, the person is neither material nor immaterial. Thus the conception of the 
person in Bantu philosophy denies the principle of dualism of soul and body. 
However, Bantu philosophy does not deny dualism of reality. Pascal Tempels writes: 
If were to start from our psychological standpoint to study the 
Bantu, we should be almost totally frustrated. Anyone, who, 
for instance, were to try to find words which correspond in 
Bantu dialects with our notions of soul, mind, will, sentiments, 
etc. would be assuming that the Bantu divide man, as we do 
into soul and body, and that they distinguish as we do the 
different faculties of the Bann/1". 
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Tempels holds that Bantu psychology is based on three notions namely vital force, 
increase of force and vital influence. The 'muntu' (person), according to the Bantu, is 
a living force; the force or being that possesses full life. Man dominates plants and 
animals and minerals. Man is the supreme force. Temples notes that we might be 
tempted to enquire in what the Bantu might find the higher force to consist in, but he 
thinks such a question would be similar to the question of exactly what the vital 
element we call the soul is. For the Bantu, the muntu is a being in a relatioa She is a 
being in relation with other forces: 
The living 'muntu' is in a relation of being to being with God, 
with his clan brethren, with his family and with his 
descendants. He is in a similar ontological relationship with 
his patrimony, his land, with all that it contains and produces, 
with all that grows or lives on itK 
Thus the one thing that is common and essential to these different conceptions of the 
person, whether Yoruba or Akan or Bantu metaphysics, is the conception of 
relationship and interaction. The spiritual and physical aspects of the Akan and 
Yoruba relate and interact with each other. So does the Akan or Yoruba person relate 
and interact with visible and invisible worlds. The Bantu person is a being in relation 
with both the visible and invisible world. It is through the living person that both the 
visible and invisible worlds actively exist. Okolo makes this point in the following 
way: 
The two orders of existence in the African worldviews relate 
to and interact with each other. (Thus) the universe or nature 
for the African is a series of interaction and interconnectioa 
To exist is more than just being there. It means standing in a 
particular relationship with all there is both visible and 
invisible. The interaction and interconnection between the 
visible created order and invisible world of God, spirits and 
ancestors are possible only through human beings; ontological 
mean between beings acting above and below". 
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Dirk J. Louw writing about the ancestors in his article Ubuntu and the Challenges of 
Multiculturalism in Post-apartheid South Africa™, says that the ancestors are 
extended family. The living must not only care for and share with each other, but the 
living and the dead depend on each other. He says that this is in accord with the daily 
experience of many traditional Africans. For instance, at calabash, which is an 
African ritual that involves the drinking of beer, a little of beer is often poured on the 
ground for the consumption of ancestors. Many Africans also believe in God through 
the mediation of ancestors. Louw holds that in African society there seems to be an 
inextricable bond between man, ancestors and God. He says that becoming 'a person 
through other persons' entails passing through various community prescribed stages 
and being involved in certain ceremonies and initiation rituals, and these rituals 
establish a link between the initiated and the community of the ancestors. Through 
circumcision and clitoridectomy blood is spilled onto the soil, a sacrifice is made 
which binds the initiated person to the land and to the departed members of the 
community. Thus there is a social relationship between the invisible and the visible 
worlds. The ancestors and human beings love and care for each other. There is a 
mutual cooperation between the two worlds, as the African persons believe that the 
dead who inhabit the invisible world are the members of their community. Okolo 
says: 
...Hence when one dies, one is believed to have gone to 
one's family in the spirit world. Consequently, in the African 
universe and in accord with people's beliefs, there are 
repeated interactions, communications, and even local 
permutations between the dead and the living spirits and 
human beings™. 
Thus the African worldview, which consists in a series of interactions, provides us 
with a relational criterion for understanding African concept of personhood. Teffo 
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etal maintain the same point: " In Western philosophy, the starting point for the 
account of personhood is usually epistemological and psychological...in the African 
thinking the starting point is social relations - selfhood is seen and accounted from 
this relational perspective™"'. Augustine Shutte explains the difference between the 
European or Western conception of persons and the African conception thus: 
... In the European philosophy of whatever kind, the self is 
always envisaged as something "inside" a person, or at least as 
a kind of container of mental properties and powers. In 
African thought, it is seen as "outside" subsisting in 
relationship. In fact the sharp distinction between self and 
world, a self that controls and changes the world and is in 
some sense "above" it, this distinction so characteristic of 
European philosophy, disappears. Self and world are united 
and intermingle in a world of reciprocal relationxlv. 
Didier Kaphagawani shares the same view, "...the Western notions of personhood 
and selfhood can be referred to as being more egocentric than African ones which 
tend to be more sociocentric"xv. 
Today, the conception of the person is African philosophy is enshrined in this Xhosa 
proverb 'Muntu ungumuntu ngababntu' meaning 'a person is a person through 
persons'. John Mbiti (in Godwin Sogolo) explains the meaning of the proverb when 
he says: 
Only in terms of other people does the individual become 
conscious of his own being, his own duties, his privileges and 
responsibilities towards himself and towards other people. 
When he suffers, he does not suffer alone but with the 
corporate groups, when he rejoices, he rejoices not alone but 
with his kinsmen, his neighbours and relatives whether dead 
or living. When he gets married, he is not alone; neither does 
the wife "belong" to him alone, so also the children belong to 
corporate body of kinsmen, even if they bear only their 
father's name. What happens to the individual happens to the 
whole group, and whatever happens to whole group happens 
to the individual. The individual can only say: T am, because 
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we are, and since we are, therefore I am. This is a cardinal 
point in the understanding of the African view of man™. 
We can see from the above that in African philosophy a person is neither essentially 
biological nor essentially psychological, but is essentially a social being. Given the 
discussion of Aristotle above, and his conception of the essentially social nature of 
human beings, it may appear that there is little that is unique to the African view. This 
would be mistaken. Nyassa says: 
The African, like everybody else is a social animal except that 
this sociality is both unique and transcendental. In the African 
mythical world, it is conceivable that the first Africans that 
ever were and ever lived in a social setting have not actually 
passed out of existence. They are here, so to speak, with us as 
invisible spirits strongly involved and always influencing us in 
setting to confirm to the traditions that they themselves forged 
and inherited'™" 
In the same vein Okolo says that the 'self in African philosophy, as in the naturalistic 
metaphysics of John Dewey, for instance, is essentially social, the person is a person 
only in relationship to others. The notable distinction is that the interconnections and 
relationship between self and others in African philosophy extend to the spirit world, 
to the ancestors, or the 'living dead'. 
The social, or relational, nature of the African self in the living world can be 
illustrated as follows: Gbadegesin traces how the individual comes to be a member of 
the community. He says that a new baby is welcomed into the waiting hands of the 
elders of the household. The experienced elderly wives in the household serve as 
midwives. It is their job to see that the mother has a safe delivery and to introduce the 
newly born baby into the family with cheerful songs, praises and prayers. The mother 
has the fundamental responsibility of breastfeeding the baby while the other needs of 
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the baby are taken care of by others: co-wives, the husband's mother and 
stepmothers, senior sisters, nieces, and cousins. All these efforts and concerns of the 
members of the family instil into the child the consciousness of being a member of 
the family and immediately she starts to assimilate and internalise the family's norms 
and values. Gbadegesin says that the structure of the family's compound makes the 
process easy in that all the members of the extended household of several related 
extended family belonging to common ancestors live together in a large compound. 
The children play together monitored by the elders and any older member of the 
household may punish any of them who misbehave. If misunderstanding arises 
among the co-wives, the elderly male and female members intervene. If they fail in 
settling the issue at hand, it is taken to the head of the family. In this kind of 
environment, he argues, growing children see themselves as a part of household and 
not as individuated, fixed selves. 
It follows that children, through socialization and the love and concern shown to them 
by the household and community, cannot but see themselves as members of that 
community. Moreover, they cannot but define themselves in relation to the 
community and their place in it: they cannot be a self in isolation from others. The 
members of the family and community take special interest in the children's success, 
as they are their own blood. Thus there is feeling of solidarity among the members. 
This communitarianism is never forced on any individual, Gbadegesein says, rather it 
develops naturally due to the experience of love and concern that the growing child 
has been exposed to™11. 
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The coming to be of the child into an existing community marks the child as a 
communitarian being by nature. Kwame Gyekye gives the communitarian conception 
of the person as follows: 
l.That a human person does not voluntarily choose to enter 
into human community, that is, community life is not optional 
for any individual persoa 2. That a human person is at once a 
cultural being. 3. That the human person cannot - perhaps 
must not - live in isolation from other persons.4. That the 
human person is naturally oriented towards other persons and 
must have relationships with them. 5. That social relationships 
are not contingent but necessary™'. 
Thus outside this network of relationships, an African person would cease to exist as 
person, and would thus not be able to realise her full personhood: a person is a person 
through others (umuntu ungumuntu ngabantu). 
Having described African metaphysics, particularly the African concept of the person 
I now turn to African ethics. 
2.4. African Ethics. 
It has been noted extensively above that Africans have a strong sense of community. 
They live in communities as members of communities rather than individuals and 
interdependence is highly regarded and practised. There is always a set of approved 
and accepted ways of living and doing things in the community. These are rules and 
norms that make living together or community life possible, fulfilling and enjoyable. 
Without these rules and norms, things would fall apart and there would be a lawless 
society. Ethics is at the centre of community life. 
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Since African society is communitarian by nature it is implied that every ethical 
principle is geared towards the well-being of the family and the community. One 
might be tempted to conclude that the individual lives and acts only for the 
community; some thinkers have indeed said that the individual is crushed under the 
community. This is not a true reflection of African traditional thought. What the 
individual has with the community is a type of symbiotic relationship. Each member 
of the community stands in relationship to other members and they are united by one 
common goal, that is, the progress of the community and the human flourishing of 
each other. Gbadegesin says: 
A high premium is placed on the practical demonstrations of 
oneness and solidarity among the members of a community. 
Every member is expected to consider him/herself as an 
integral part of the whole and to play an appropriate role 
towards the good of all. Cooperation is voluntarily given and 
is institutionalised in several ways. Wives of the family (co-
wives, wives of brothers, wives of cousins, etc.) know that 
they are expected to cooperate in raising their children as full 
members of the family. They are free to borrow household 
items from one another, they are free to baby sit for one 
another...5" 
To illustrate further there is another kind of mutual cooperation exhibited in farming 
and agriculture. "A member may call upon the group to help him to harvest or plant 
or clear weeds. He only has to feed the participants and later he may also be called 
upon to help... it is clear that the individual is helped by the community...XXI" 
Thus the individual is given every encouragement to thrive and be what she wants to 
be. The sky is her limit in realising her potentialities. And a good community is the 
one that allows its members to express their talents and potentialities. The 
individual's responsibility is always to try not to bring disgrace to her community. 
40 
She is expected to contribute to the progress and welfare of the community in her 
endeavours. 
Every individual is expected to learn and abide by the rules and norms of the 
community. It is by keeping the rules and laws of the community that the individual 
is recognised and accorded the title of personhood in the community. In African 
society personhood is normally achieved or attained; it is not inherited by birth. 
Ifeanyi Menkiti says: 
For personhood is something which has to be achieved, is not 
given simply because one is born of human seeds. Thus it is 
not enough to have before us the biological organism, with 
certain rudimentary psychological characteristics are seen as 
attaching it, we must also conceive of the organism as going 
through a long process of social and ritual transformations 
until it attains the full compliment of excellencies seen as truly 
definition of man. And during this long process of attainment, 
the community plays a vital role as a catalyst and as a 
prescriber of norms'1™". 
And, for Menkiti, traditional African society emphasised the rituals of in cooperation 
and the importance of learning the social rules and norms of the community so that 
the human being would come to attain social selfhood, that is, become a person with 
all the attendant qualities. This is similar to Aristotle's view of personhood. I discuss 
the similarities between the African view of personhood and Aristotle's view of 
personhood in chapter three. 
In African society, personhood is the peak or telos of the individual's development as 
a human being. To achieve personhood is to live a life that is flourishing and 
fulfilling, and this is not separate from the ethics of the community. Ethics is 
fundamental to the constitution of a person in African society. Personhood is 
achieved by adhering to the moral or ethical principles of a given community. Thus 
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personhood or moral personality is a potentiality that is achieved in due course. In 
African society, ethics is built around the concept of Ubuntu. 
2.5. Ubuntu. 
Ubuntu is considered to be the organising principle of African ethics. Ubuntu 
concerns human solidarity and it is enshrined in the words of Xhosa proverbs 
discussed above: umuntu ungumuntu ngabantu. Thus it is strongly premised upon the 
African communitarian conception of the person. 
The African worldview tells us that a person is a social being by nature and that she 
can only succeed and survive in a community. Ubuntu is by definition only lived and 
realised in a society. This society is influenced by and in relation to the invisible 
world of the ancestors and the gods. This also shows a land of social relationship 
between the living human beings and the invisible world of the ancestors. 
Christopher Ejizu (in N. Barney Pityana) says: 
...The gods and cosmic forces may be invisible. But they are 
very powerful, often times aggressive and keenly interested 
in the activities of men... Moral norms and the customary 
code of conduct are hallowed and explained as ordinances of 
the gods and founding ancestors. Human behaviour is so 
crucial in the maintenance of the delicately balanced 
equilibrium existing between the spirit world and the human 
world. Any grave misconduct or infringement of the 
accepted code would upset the balance and thereby imperil 
the fortunes of men.™" 
There is no place for radical individualism in African ethics and the traditional 
African worldview. An individual cannot exist independently and separately from the 
rest of the society: 
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... But be it noted, the individuality, which Ubuntu respects, 
is not of Cartesian making. On the contrary, Ubuntu directly 
contradicts the Cartesian conception of individuality in terms 
of which the individual or self can be conceived without 
necessarily conceiving the other. The Cartesian individual 
exists prior to, or separately and independently from the rest 
of the community or society. The rest of the society is 
nothing but an added extra to a pre-existent and self-
sufficient being... By contrast, Ubuntu defines the individual 
in terms of his/her relationship with others...Being an 
individual by definition being with others. 'With - others'... 
is not an added extra to a pre-existent and self -sufficient 
being; rather, both this being (the self) and the others find 
themselves in a whole wherein they are already related. xxn/ 
Johann Broodryk, in his book Ubuntu: Life Lessons From Africa*™ says that Ubuntu 
can be defined as a comprehensive ancient African world view based on the values of 
intense humanness, caring, sharing, respect, compassion and associated values, 
ensuring a happy and qualitative community life in a spirit of family. Values, for 
Broodryk, are the basic foundation of each person's view of how life is supposed to 
be and lived. These values influence choices, attitudes as well as goals in life. Since 
they are accompanied by strong feelings, it is proposed that they be regarded as the 
assegais of a person in cultural and general life. Broodryk goes on to mention the 
principal values and associated values of Ubuntu as: 
Core Values Associated Values. 
Humanness Warmth, tolerance, understanding, 
Peace, Humanity. 
Caring Empathy, sympathy, helpfulness, 
Charitable, Friendliness. 
Sharing Giving (unconditionally) redistribution. 
Open-handedness. 
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Respect Commitment, dignity, obedience, 
Order, normative. 
Compassion Love, cohesion, informality, forgiving, 
Spontaneity 
The good life in African society consists in living out the values of Ubuntu. When the 
individual lives out these values to their practical fullness, she actualises the 
potentialities of her human existence thereby attaining personhood, which is to live a 
happy or flourishing life. Thus the basic values of humanness like caring, sharing, 
respect, and compassion are cardinal to live and enjoy life cemented in true, real and 
selfless happiness says Broodryk. 
Ubuntu embodies those qualities that define the essence of being human. It also 
embodies the potential of being a flourishing human. The concept of Ubuntu is 
similar to the concept of the function of human beings in Aristotle's ethics, serving to 
link and to define what it is to be a person and what it is to be a good person. By the 
values of Ubuntu the individual is constantly challenged by others to achieve self-
fulfilment in order to live a happy or flourishing life. 
Anthony H.M. Kirk-Greene, discussing in his article Mutumin Kirki: The concept of 
the good man in Hausa*"', a people of the Northern part of Nigeria, says that the hero 
need not simultaneously be a good person but the good person will always be the hero 
of her community. According to Kirk-Greene, the 'title' of good person is awarded to 
an individual only in the context of her relationship with her fellow human beings for 
the qualities of mutumin kirki such as tmthfulness, trustworthiness, and patience. 
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These are tested only in the situations of human relationship and interaction. It is by 
the way a person treats her fellow human beings, regardless of their situation in 
society, that the Hausa will evaluate her according to the criteria of being ethically 
good, and deciding whether or not she fulfils their concept of Mutumin Kirki. As 
Broodryk says, the ideal person according to Ubuntu possesses all the virtues of 
Ubuntu: she is kind, generous, living in harmony with others, friendly, modest, 
helpful, humble and happyxxv". 
2.6. The Formation of Ethical Character. 
In the traditional African society, the extended family system that includes several 
generations of relatives dwelling in a compound, or near to each other, constitute the 
family. In the African family, the mother has the primary responsibility for her child's 
upbringing and social developments. However this responsibility is also shared 
among all the members of the family and community. They stipulate social roles and 
moral norms for the child with the sole aim of preparing her for adulthood. 
Consequently, the African child learns from her earliest years to be a respectful, 
responsible, and supportive member of the family and community. 
In the larger community or society, which is made up of many families, the child 
comes to learn from others about the virtues of communal life and how to be a 
committed member, and to work for her welfare and the welfare of the community. 
Through others the child learns, among other things, how farm work and other 
commercial enterprises are carried out: 
Within countries in sub Saharan Africa, children are highly 
valued; they are 'a gift of God'. Children are the perpetuators 
bf the family and society. Because of this it is the 
responsibility of the community to see that children are raised 
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appropriately, and it is expected that as they grow into 
adulthood they will provide for older members of the 
community. Their view of children influences how their needs 
are met. Within traditional cultures, childrearing practices are 
based on a culturally bound understanding of what the 
children's needs are and what thev are expected to 
become***". 
s 
The aim of childrearing in African society is to help the child to become a fully-
grown person, umuntu, that is, for her to reach full personhood. Thus, in the process 
of growing up, the family and the community help the child to undergo a series of 
social and ritual developments that link and integrate the child with the community, 
including the ancestors. The ritual developments and initiations also aim at educating 
the child in the community values and norms so that the child becomes a fully 
fulfilled and actualised persoa If this is successful, she achieves all the values of 
Ubuntu that define her as having achieved full personhood in the community. 
Nhlanhlan Mkize says: 
The communal way of life saw childrearing as the collective 
responsibility of the community. Rites of passage were 
organised to mark the various stages of personhood. It is 
important to emphasise that these rites were a collective 
responsibility of the community. Not only did they endow 
the growing person with a sense of identity and meaning in 
life, they also played an essential role in inculcating the value 
of Ubuntu thought to be essential for harmonious societal 
functioning5™1*. 
Kanyike makes the same point: 
The society that comes to meet him or her with jubilation at 
the end of his/her initiation into adulthood has just given 
him/her an education, which is a means to an end and not an 
end in itself. Social responsibility, job orientation, political 
participation, spiritual and moral values are all important 
aspects of African education and society wants to see in them 
in the life of the new adult. His action is the place where 
society realises itself". 
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When the individual embodies and practices all the values of Ubuntu in her 
community, for her well-being and that of her community, she becomes a fulfilled or 
flourishing person. Importantly, when the individual fails to attain personhood, it is 
not the individual that is blamed but the community, which is seen as failing to 
educate and socialise the individual appropriately. Failure of an individual to achieve 
flourishing means that the community has failed in instilling the values of Ubuntu. 
Having now discussed the communitarian nature of both Aristotelian and African 
ethics, in the next chapter I discuss the kind of society required for human flourishing, 
implicit in both Aristotelian and African ethics. I argue that Aristotelian and African 
ethics considered together can provide us with an account of the kind of society 
required for human flourishing. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Kind of Society Required for Human Flourishing. 
3.1. Introduction. 
In this chapter, I consider, out of a comparison of Aristotelian and African ethics, the 
kind of society that is required for human flourishing. In both Aristotelian and African 
ethics, the kind of society required for human flourishing concerns the structure and 
kinds of relationship that must exist between individuals, and groups of individuals, in 
order to promote and achieve the formation of ethical character and thus human 
flourishing. 
In the first section, I consider the Aristotelian ideal society, using the ideas of 
Aristotle and Aristotelians such as Pedro Tabensky and Martha C. Nussbaum1. In the 
second section, I consider the type of society, or networks of relationships, that 
African ethics advocates for human flourishing, making particular use of Chinua 
Achebe's novel, Things Fall Apart. In the third section, I compare and contrast these 
two accounts of the formation of ethical character that equip the individual with the 
capabilities for living a flourishing life. My aim in this chapter is not to critique either 
account but to show that Aristotelian ethics is sufficiently similar to African ethics to 
enrich our understanding of the kind of society required for human flourishing in 
African ethics. At the same time, the depth of similarity helps to bring into sharp 
relief that which is truly unique to the African ethical account. 
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Aristotelian and African ethics hold that good life depends on sharing with others. 
Individual flourishing is only possible in a good community where the individual 
shares and participates in the life of the community and the community in turn shares 
and participates in the life of the individual. There is a flourishing of both the 
individual and the community when there is a symbiotic relationship between them. 
Both Aristotelian and African ethics discount the possibility of a life that is radically 
autonomous, that is, a life that is lived independently of others, because this goes 
against our essentially social and rational nature. In brief, the individual flourishes 
when she is able to realise her potential, and society is good or flourishing when it 
offers its members the social conditions necessary for achieving this potential that is 
the eudaimonia life, or the life of full personhood. 
3.2.The Kind of Society Required for Human Flourishing and the Formation of 
Ethical Character in Aristotle's Ethics. 
It has been shown above that we are essentially, according to Aristotle, both rational 
and social. It is by living with others that a person can become good or virtuous and 
express her goodness to others through rational activities and choices. Thus a good 
person, or a virtuous person, cannot be virtuous and live the flourishing life unless she 
lives in a certain kind of relationship to and with others. Tabensky says. 
A person is defined as a creature whose telos is eudaimonia 
Moreover, since persons are necessary social, it follows that 
only social creatures can achieve eudaimonia. The fact that 
we are, by nature, social creature, helps us visualise the 
importance social being has to play in formation of our 
lives... because the formation is closely tied up with specific 
settings, then it must be the case that flourishing is only 
possible if the settings are appropriate... the possibility of 
achieving eudaimonia is intimately tied in with particular 
types of settings that provide the conditions for the 
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possibility of achieving eudaimonia The good life, ...can 
only flourish in what could be characterised as a good 
society". 
Tabensky in his book, Happiness, Personhood, Community, Purpose, makes 
prominent the kind of society, or network of relationships, that is required for human 
flourishing in Aristotelian ethics. He claims that analysing these social conditions will 
assist us to understand the nature and structure of eudaimonia; that it is only in 
appropriate relationships that an individual can stay active in ways that are 
constitutive of the eudaimonia ideal. He holds that the particular ways in which an 
individual relates to and with others, the choices she makes and specific projects she 
undertakes with others in her social environment say a great deal about what it means 
to live as a eudaimon individual, and the external conditions1" that are necessary for 
eudaimon life. 
Aristotle argues that we cannot achieve human flourishing or eudaimonia outside 
society. And society, for Aristotle, is constituted by different networks of friendship 
{philia). For Aristotle, the fundamental conditions for the existence of social 
relationships are relationships of friendship. Friendships hold states together. As 
Tabensky says, friendship involves bonds of care and concern, or reciprocal bonds of 
love'v. Not all types of friendships, however, are capable of providing the individual 
with the social conditions necessary for living a eudaimon life. There are three kinds 
of friendship, according to Aristotle. First is friendship based on mutual usefulness or 
utility. In this kind of friendship, the people love each other for the sake of the 
advantages they can get from each other. They do not love each other for the sake of 
the other. Second is the kind of friendship that is based on mutual pleasure. Here too, 
the people do not love each other for the sake of the other. For instance, those in a 
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sexual relationship love each other for the pleasure they can get from each other. This 
kind of friendship normally comes to an end when there is no longer pleasure 
involved. The third kind of friendship Aristotle identifies is that based on mutual 
goodness and mutual willing of good for the other. It is true love of the other for her 
own sake. Here, the good of the other is the object of the friendship and not some 
external advantage or pleasure. This is the true or virtuous friendship, as its goal is 
nothing but the good living or human flourishing of the other. Carolyn Ray, quoting 
Aristotle, says: 
The friendship, which has the good as its object, is based on 
the character of each partner, rather than on utility or 
pleasure. A friendship based on utility might occur between 
two business partners, such friendship would dissolve if the 
business were to fold. (NE 1157al5-16). A friendship based 
on pleasure might exist between two people who find each 
other physically attractive and end when the initial thrill 
wears off. (NE 1157a7-10). But virtuous character 
(friendship) is more stable (1156 bl2) (in most cases), and is 
hence more durable. Furthermore, this is the most complete, 
because such friendships involve love of each person in 
himself for who he is. (1156a 10- 14)v. 
Following Aristotle, Tabensky argues that the virtuous friendship is a sort of 
relationship in which an individual is able to express her goodness. Moreover, it gives 
the individual the opportunity to learn how to act in accord with the complete virtue 
that is eudaimonia. As the individual fundamentally lives for eudaimonia, thus the 
best or truest friendship is meant to help the individual to attain eudaimon life, human 
flourishing, the telos of every human organisation or associatioa 
Virtue friendship based on the ideal of complete virtue is 
desirable to virtuous subjects because virtuous subjects have 
a practical understanding of the role played by this friendship 
in a eudaimon life. Virtuous subjects have an appreciation of 
the character of their companion, and because of this 
appreciation they find sharing time with their companions 
enjoyable, or at any rate desirable" 
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Aristotle's reasons for thinking that the good individual can only hope to achieve 
eudaimonia within the context of virtuous friendships or relationships are enumerated 
in the Nichomachean Ethics 1169b8-1170b25: 
Human beings are political, and it is better to live with 
friends than with strangers whose character is unknown. 
We need to observe the actions of virtuous friends, since we 
can watch others better than we watch ourselves, and it is 
pleasant to watch virtuous actions. 
Eudaimonia is a continuous activity, not a possession and it 
is easier to be active with friends than alone. 
Friends cultivate each other's virtue. Friends help each other 
live to the fullest extent by prompting them to exercise their 
understanding (and it is pleasant to perceive that one is 
engaging in the most important human activity). Friends are 
related to each other as they are to themselves and thus a 
friend's life is choice worthy to his friend. A friend is 
someone to talk to and being choice worthy by nature, must 
be had because without them a person is not self-sufficient 
but deficient""'. 
Tabensky discussing Aristotle's reasons for the need of virtuous friendships says that 
for an individual to have a good life, she must not only be continuously active but 
continuously active in the right manner. And this right manner can only be had in the 
context of virtuous friendships. With good friends one is able to be active in the ways 
that are expressive of complete virtue. Tabensky explains that virtuous friendship 
helps people to form intimate reciprocal bonds of care and concern which are 
necessary for living a good life. In the company of true friends an individual learns 
how to act and live well in accordance with the eudaimon principle. And she 
understands that her living eudaimon life affects and incorporates the eudaimon life of 
her friends. 
In Book 1 of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that the eudaimon life must 
be self- sufficient. For Aristotelians, a self-sufficient life is a life that is complete; it is 
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not a life that is radically autonomous. Self-sufficiency is attained in the company of 
others, which confirms our nature as social creatures. The manner in which we relate 
to each other determines our ideal self-sufficiency. Hence, virtuous friendships are, 
for Aristotle, one fundamental sort of interaction that constitutes a self-sufficient life. 
... That the good life is an active one ... to have an active life 
one must be in the right circumstances for being active in the 
relevant ways. The ways that are relevant ... involve being 
active among and towards one philoi... it is for reasons such 
as that establishing bonds of philia are constitutive of the 
possibility of being eudaimon individual"". 
Tabensky raises a very important question at this point: will intimate friendship not 
separate the circle of friends from the larger community, leading to the exclusion of 
wider community from our sphere of concerns? He responds by pointing out that the 
intimate friends are members of the large community, and as the members of the 
large community who make use of other services, such as medical and transport 
facilities provided by the community at large, so they understand how their life is 
dependent on the whole community. Hence a virtuous person will appreciate and 
understand the role her community plays in her good living, and see her community 
and other members of her community as part of her self, thereby making her also to 
care for the large community. 
It is clear that caring for oneself in a way that reflect a proper practical understanding 
of human flourishing entails a care for those conditions that makes one's flourishing 
possible, and these conditions are among other things, constituted by the community 
at large, says Tabensky. He claims that it is in sharing with intimate friends that an 
individual also automatically learns about human joy and suffering, she learns to 
understand how circumstances (internal and external) influence the quality of our 
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lives. Moreover, sharing with friends is the best way to learn about virtues and 
become virtuous in all her dealings with her intimates and other members of the 
community. She learns too that others who are not members of her intimate 
friendships are like her and in this manner she comes to empathize and care for 
others. Maj Charles A. Paff seems to support this point: 
In the virtue approach to human flourishing, something is 
good if it contributes to creating the conditions for the good 
life for everyone. Since every one enjoys this good life, 
agents do not need to choose between what is good for them 
and what is good for others. In this approach, the agent's 
action benefits themselves as well as others'x. 
Aristotle holds that by being in virtuous friendships, an individual cultivates a good 
character in relation to her intimate friends as they influence each other. To be a 
eudaimon individual is an on-going process, thus it is by staying in continuous 
virtuous relationships that one can learn and develop further the habit of acting 
virtuously. 
Aristotle argues further that the nature of philia is very much like the nature of self-
love. Thus the individual is able to commune with someone if she is able to recognise 
someone as another self. By recognising someone as another self, she is able to 
compare their character, decisions, actions, intentions and goals with hers, and by this 
comparison, they form a shared or common ethic that will allow them to weave their 
life together in a communion of friendship. This contributes to the good of each 
philoi. Tabensky says: 
A crucial factor that differentiates friendships from other sorts 
of ethical engagement is that, ideally, when one engages with 
a close friend, one engages with an individual not just for this 
or that reason but in ways that summon the mutual expression 
of our character. One engages with someone's whole life. It is 
by engaging in these sorts of dialogical engagement that one 
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is able to recognise one's humanity in the fullest sense - one 
is able to recognise one is relevantly like those one is sharing 
with. And in this manner one is able to inform one's action 
towards others (not just friends but to persons in general) in a 
way that reflects sensitivities of the human spirit." 
In the Aristotelian framework, the ethical ideal that determines our interactions and 
emotional responses with our community is communal justice. According to Aristotle 
"We see that all men mean by justice, that kind of state of character which makes 
people disposed to do what is just; and similarly by injustice that state which makes 
them act unjustly and wish for what is unjust"."1 Commenting on Aristotle's 
definition of justice, Tabensky says that for Aristotle, justice is a state of character, 
which a just individual possesses, and which makes her act justly. He conceives 
justice as a complete virtue 'but not absolutely'. It is not complete virtue absolutely 
because it is complete virtue only in relation to others rather than being virtue both in 
relation to others and oneself. For Aristotle, a given action would count as just if it is 
the sort of action a person of good character would direct towards others and which 
reflects her goodness. According to Aristotle, and Tabensky, an individual could only 
become a good person if her intimate relationships are good, and more particularly, 
only if she surrounds herself with virtuous friends. Thus in an Aristotelian sense, 
having virtuous friends, is a prerequisite for being ideally just, as complete virtue is 
cultivated amongst virtuous relationships. The purpose of justice is to help the 
individual achieve the telos of her life that is eudaimonia In their circle of intimate 
friends, she learns how to act justly towards each other for the sake of eudaimonia. 
Just acts of a just person are not only performed towards that individual's circle of 
friends, they also extend to other members of the community. This is because the just 
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individual understands that her telos, which is the eudaimon life, is implicated in the 
telos of each member of her community. She is aware that her circle of friends is one 
of the networks of friendships that exist in her community; that the members of her 
circle of friends might belong to other intimate friendships in which she is not 
involved. So for her life to flourish, the whole community must be a flourishing one. 
Thus from the just individual's circle of love, she learn how to love and care for the 
whole community: 
...Thus the love cultivated in one zone of our social fabrics 
flows the delicate fibres that link us all into one community, 
such that one cannot properly consider the well-being of 
those closest to oneself without at the same time taking into 
account the general framework of interlocking dialogical 
relationship which constitute a (global) community within 
which one web of love is embedded.H1 
According to Tabensky then, it is not easy to separate the self-concern and our 
concern for our closest friends from the concern we ought to have for our community 
at large. It is not that we are expected to love every person in our community, rather 
we must care for our community at large because our eudaimonia is implicated in the 
well-being of our global community. If our global community flourishes, our life will 
also be a flourishing one since it yields the conditions for our continued eudaimon 
existence. It yields these conditions by providing us with friends, services such as 
communication, transportation, and other infrastructural facilities that contribute to 
our living well. 
However, it is from the association of her intimate friends that an individual can 
acquire the virtues that will help her care for herself and friends, and also care and 
love those outside her circle of love because her life is interconnected with theirs. 
There is a relationship of mutual constitution of love between the quality of the web 
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of love that constitutes the social and the quality of the social a whole, says Tabensky. 
He holds that that to a large extent, the responsibility for constructing an ideal society 
rest not so much on our leaders but on the manner in which we relate to those we love 
because from the basis of the love we have for our closest friend we learn how to 
relate to our community at large. Maurice Cornforth supports this point: 
It is possible, by "political means" to remove the causes of 
poverty and war, and to provide everyone with the material 
means for useful work, education, leisure, comfort and the 
protection of health. Even that, of course, would still not 
suffice to establish happiness (human flourishing), for 
whether individuals are happy or not still depend on how 
thev relate to each other and how each behaves in personal 
life...™ 
As Tabensky notes, individuals have different histories, interests, and dispositions, 
and these variations can cause conflict in the community. However a eudaimon 
subject can get over this conflict because she understands that the overall pattern of 
her good life is enmeshed in a larger community and the concessions she makes in 
regard to the conflicts are for the overall good of her life - a good that involves the 
lives of other people. For instance, there might be a conflict in the community due to 
differences of opinion. In this kind situation, a eudaimon subject may reason that the 
proponents of differing opinion are not like her, and they might have come to 
entertain such opinion due to their family and educational backgrounds. So instead of 
allowing such a situation to disrupt her happiness and that of the community she will 
make effort to accommodate their differences and even when necessary make 
corrections in a constructive and amicable way for the sake of every person's 
eudaimonia or flourishing. 
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Note, however, the perfect society being advocated by Tabensky is not one of perfect 
harmony. He believes a perfect harmony could only be achieved in a homogeneous 
society where all people are the same with no difference in character or dispositions. 
However, such environment cannot foster the development of a good character, he 
argues. According to Tabensky, the uniqueness of our individual histories makes each 
of us special. He argues that dwelling in a world of difference helps the individual 
better understand and appreciate where one is coming from. That the other person 
does and sees things differently from her is an invitation for her to reconsider the way 
in which she does and sees things. 
Multiple perspectives held by persons in dialogue clearly 
enrich the understandings of the ethical dimensions of the 
world. This last claim follows quite naturally from the fact 
having to relate to a large variety of different persons places a 
moral demand on us that would not exist were we to live in a 
world that was radically under-populated by communicators 
(Creatures who engage in social engagements because of their 
thinking capacity)*™ 
The world of difference assists the development of character in that the individual's 
knowledge of her differences enables her to appreciate the other person's differences. 
Insofar as the individual would like others to respect her differences, she respects 
their differences. Training herself to respect and uphold the interests of others is a 
virtue that should be encouraged because it contributes to the individual and to the 
community's flourishing. Tabensky says: 
Moreover, in sharing with virtue friends, one most perfectly 
learns about virtue, and hence one is in the best possible 
position to act towards others as demanded by our ever-
changing circumstances...In learning these things... one also 
learns about the fragility of one's own goodness, and of the 
goodness of others. Because one is (ideally) content with who 
one is and one is able to recognise the fragility of one's own 
good fortune, one is also able to appreciate how others may 
not be in the same position, and one is able to act in ways that 
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are expressive of this understanding- one is able, for instance, 
to feel compassion for others and act accordingly." 
Hence, to be a person in the fullest sense entails having a full sense of the 
relationship between the self, the other person and the world at large. This kind of 
relationship is only had in a pluralistic environment; the kind of environment that 
comprises of many individuals of different dispositions and orientations but still 
respects the uniqueness of each of the individuals and the status of the community. 
This is an environment that does not stifle but rather uses the uniqueness and 
initiatives of each individual for the flourishing of each of it's members and the 
community at large, as the community can only flourish when its members live a 
flourishing life. "The sort of community we should aspire to live in is a pluralistic one 
and one that fosters a relationship that does not involve blinding ourselves to the 
humanity of others'"" 
As rational, social creatures that are naturally directed towards the realisation of full 
personhood that is eudaimonia, we are thus naturally endowed to live in a pluralistic 
yet communitarian community - a community that fosters and respects individual 
differences. Remember that full personhood is primarily an activity. It is the activity 
of living well. To achieve eudaimonia is to be active amongst others. An individual 
who relates well or virtuously to others realises her full potentiality, that is, full 
personhood, which is the eudaimonia life. 
For her, the virtuous relationships that leads to eudaimonia life effect the whole 
community as the activities that are involved in living a flourishing life extend 
towards others in many ways that foster and nourish the good of the whole 
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community. "...A good society is a function of individual initiative; a good social 
order flow upwards from the individual to the collective. It therefore follows that one 
cannot expect to live happily if one delegates social responsibility to others3""". 
It follows from the above, Tabensky argues, that the function of the leaders in any 
community should be to coordinate the different efforts made by individuals towards 
realisation of flourishing society. Just like any other individual, their task is one of 
promoting over all flourishing, as their own flourishing depends on the flourishing of 
others - they and their subjects are in an interconnected relationship. Tabensky holds 
too that the purpose of leadership and other social institutions should not be seen as a 
replacement of the individual's responsibility, but rather their purpose should be to 
encourage active participation of every individual in the common good- a good that is 
pluralistic, complex and dynamic. The goodness at issue in no way stands over and 
above individual interest. For Tabensky, collective goodness is that which is 
constituted by the goals of the individuals who comprise the community. 
A good society in Aristotelian ethics, according to Tabensky, is "... one that offers the 
appropriate conditions for flourishing... an ideal society offers the necessary external 
conditions for the flourishing of each member of that society3""" A society structured 
around virtuous relationship is the right kind of society required for upbringing of 
children so that they acquire the virtues. According to Aristotle, virtue does not arise 
by nature. A person becomes virtuous when others train her, and she herself practises 
virtues. So in the virtuous society, the children learn to do good under the guidance of 
virtuous adults. As the child is being trained, virtuous parents and teachers will ensure 
that what the child considers as pleasant will be acts in accordance with virtue. They 
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will exhort her to perform such acts even when these acts may seem unpleasant and 
contrary to the child's inclinations. Parents train the child through their good 
examples and exhortation, and praising the child when she performs a good act. With 
time the acts involved will become more attractive because of the reward and 
approbation she receives. 
The virtuous community helps the child to realise that there is more to such actions 
than the external rewards which have been attached to them. They mean more, not 
only in themselves, but to the virtuous community into which child is growing: 
becoming a full member of the community or becoming virtuous entails 
acknowledging the value of such actions, doing them, and becoming the kind of 
person who does them because of their intrinsic worth"1"". 
Having considered the kind of society required for human flourishing and formation 
of ethical character in Aristotle's ethics let us now consider the type of society that 
African ethics advocates for human flourishing and ethical character formation. 
3.3 The Kind of Society Required for Human Flourishing and the Formation of 
Ethical Character in African Ethics. 
In African society, as it has been noted in chapter two of this work, personhood is the 
peak or telos of the individual's development as a human person. To achieve 
personhood is to live a life that is flourishing, and this is not separated from the moral 
life of the community. In African ethics, morality is part of the fundamental 
constitution of a person. Full personhood is achieved by adhering to the moral or 
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ethical principles of a given community. Personhood, or moral personality, is a 
potentiality that is realised in due course in a community. It is realised in the fullest 
sense by being active in the community. Edward Kanyike says: "When the Bantu 
speaks of someone as not being a person, muntu, they refer almost always to a lack in 
human relations. To be human is to know how to live well in society™"' 
The African person is first and foremost a social being, as discussed above. She can 
only live and survive in the community. Moreover, the African ethic of Ubuntu is 
only lived and realised in the community. Dirk J. Louw says "The Ubuntu ethics 
unites the self and the world in a peculiar web of reciprocal relations in which subject 
and object become indistinguishable, and in which T think therefore I am' is 
substituted for I participate therefore I amxx". To exist as a full person in traditional 
African society, the individual has to participate in the common good or values held 
by the society. 
Despite this fact, African ethics encourages and respects the uniqueness of each 
individual while discouraging anything that separates the individual from her 
community. It encourages and upholds the symbiotic relationship between the 
individual and the community. An individual may, due to her talents, or wisdom rise 
to an important height in the community. However, it is still the community that 
accords her recognition and honour. 
Chinua Achebe, in his novel Things Fall Apart0", shows that in traditional African 
society, especially in Ibo society, an individual cannot survive independent of the 
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community's values and cohesion. This is evident in the life of Okonkwo, the central 
character in the novel. 
Things Fall Apart tells the story of the first contacts between Ibo villagers and white 
European missionaries and colonial administration in the 1890's; in other words, of 
the coming of the Christian era to Africa Okonkwo is a man who determines to 
overcome the example of his lazy and jolly father Unoka, and to elevate himself to a 
position of respect in the Ibo community of Umuofia through acts of strength and 
courage. He is admired for his physical strength and his hardworking spirit. Okonkwo 
wills himself to become the opposite of all that his father represents: 
Okonkwo ruled his household with a heavy hand. His wives 
especially the youngest, lived in perpetual fear of his fiery 
temper, and so did his little children. Perhaps down his heart 
Okonkwo was not a cruel man. But his whole life was 
dominated by fear, the fear of failure and of weakness. It was 
deeper and more intimate than the fear of evil and capricious 
gods and of magic, the fear of the forest, and the forces of 
nature, malevolent, red in tooth and claw. Okonkwo's fear 
was greater than these. It was not external but lay deep 
within himself, it was fear of himself, lest he should be found 
to resemble his father's failure and weakness, and even now 
he still remembered how he had suffered when a playmate 
that had told him that his father was agbala. That was how 
Okonkwo first came to know that agbala was not only 
another name for a woman, it could also mean a man who 
had taken no title. And so Okonkwo was ruled by one 
passion - to hate everything that his father Unoka had loved. 
One of those things was gentleness another was idleness™1. 
Achebe writing about the physical prowess of Okonkwo at war says: 
He was a man of action, a man of war. Unlike his father he 
could stand the look of blood. In Umuofia's war he was first 
to bring home a human head. That was his fifth head, and he 
was not an old man yet. On great occasions, such as the 
funeral of a village celebrity he drank his palm wine from his 
first human head3™11. 
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When Okonkwo accidentally kills another man at a village festival, his community 
destroys his compound and exiles him to his mother's clan for seven years. It is while 
living in his mother's clan, Mbanta, that he meets for the first time the Christian 
missionaries. The Christian missionaries with simple message of Christian love and 
inclusion attract many converts, including the tribal outcast, the Osu, who are not 
welcomed in the community. Then conflict arises between the community and the 
Church when one of the Osu kills the sacred Python revered and worshipped by the 
community. In Mbanta no one dare kill the royal python. It is addressed as our Father. 
This results in a meeting of the rulers and elders of Mbanta to discuss the fate of 
Christians. In that meeting, Okonkwo says in reference to die Christians, "... until the 
abominable gang is chased out of the village with whips, there will be no peacexxlv". 
But someone counsels: 
It is not our custom to fight for our god, let us not presume to 
do so now. If a man kills the sacred python in the secrecy of 
his heart, the matter lies between him and the god... If we 
put ourselves between the god and his victim we may receive 
blows intended for the offender0™. 
Okonkwo retorts sharply: 
Let us not reason like cowards ... If a man comes to my hut 
and defecates on the floor, what do I do? Do I shut my eyes? 
No! I take a stick and break his head. That is what a man 
does. These people are dairy pouring filth over us, and Okeke 
says we should pretend not to see... this was a womanly 
clan, he thought. Such a thing could never happen in his 
fatherland Umuofia.xxvi. 
After serving his seven years in exile, he returns to his home village Umuofia only to 
discover that the white missionaries have come to stay in Umuofia He wants to fight 
them but his old friend Obierika counsels otherwise: 
How do you think we can fight when our own brothers have 
turned against us? The white man is very clever. He came 
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quietly and peaceably with his religion We were amused 
with his foolishness and allowed him to stay. Now he has 
won our brothers and our clan can no longer act like one. He 
has put a knife in the things that held us together and we 
were fallen apart*3""1. 
The tension between the Church and the community continues to boil up. The 
overzealous converts provoke the villagers and the villagers retaliate by destroying 
the church building. The Government intervenes in order to restore peace in Umuofia, 
but Okonkwo wants Umuofia to fight the Government that has aligned itself with the 
Church. With his machete, Okonkwo murders the messenger sent by the colonial 
government. In this murder he acted alone as the members of his clan were no longer 
united. When the district commissioner comes to arrest him, Okonkwo is found to 
have hanged himself. In acting alone in killing the messenger, Okonkwo failed to 
reason together with his clan. Such behaviour destroys the bond that holds the 
community together. And, Achebe seems to be saying, destroys the individual for 
without such bonds, the individual cannot exist. 
Carl Brucker writes. 
Okonkwo's greatest flaw is his inability to adapt to cultural change. He 
is humiliated that Umuofia does not rise in his support and go to war 
against the white man. In a final desperate act, he murdered the district 
commissioner's messenger and hangs himself. At the end of the novel, 
Okonkwo stands alone, a self-proclaimed defender of a rigid 
traditionalism that contradicts the true flexibility of his culture. He is an 
exceptional individual, but the heroism of his final act of defiance is 
undercut by his alienation form his clan. He does not understand that 
Umuofia is a living culture and has always adapted to meet new 
challenges™*'. 
What I hope to have shown with the tragic story of Okonkwo is that one needs the 
community to survive in traditional African society since the individual is simply 
considered as an entity firmly embedded in society. Any individual who alienates 
herself from the communal values and norms or fights against the values that the 
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community stands for will not live a flourishing life in Afncan society. Indeed, it may 
be difficult for the individual to live any kind of life. This is evident in the life of 
Okonkwo who single-handedly takes it upon himself to champion what he sees to be 
the cause of Ibo society in Achebe's novel. 
One might argue that Okonkwo's community is a kind of community that stifles 
individual autonomy. This is not a true reflection of the Umuofia community, 
however, because the community provided him with the social conditions to flourish 
and, thus, to exercise his autonomy. The community recognized his physical prowess 
and allowed him to represent them in village wrestling competitions and also elevated 
him to a great position in the community. African ethics does not crush individual 
autonomy. It advocates the communal conditions necessary for individual autonomy 
to flourish. The community provides the conditions and the backdrop for the 
expression of individual talents and the realisation of individual potential. The elders 
said in regard to Okonkwo: 
Okonkwo was clearly cut out for great things. He was still 
young but he had won fame as the greatest wrestler in the 
nine villages. He was a wealthy farmer and had two barns 
full of yams, and had just married his third wife. To crown it 
all, he had taken two titles and had shown incredible prowess 
in two intertribal wars. And so, although Okonkwo was still 
young, he was already one of the greatest men of his time. 
Age was respected among his people, but achievement was 
revered. As the elders said, if a child washed his hands, he 
could eat with kings. Okonkwo had clearly washed bis hands 
and so he ate with king and elders."3™ 
The community support for individual flourishing is also seen in another episode. 
During the farming season when Okonkwo had cleared his farm but had no yam seeds 
to plant, he approached his family friend Nwakibie, for assistance. He said: 
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I have come to you for help... perhaps you can already guess 
what it is. I have cleared a farm but have no yams to sow. I 
know what it is to ask a man to trust another with his yam, 
especially these days when young men are afraid of hard 
work... if you give me some yam seeds, I shall not fail 
XXX 
you . 
Nwakibie in response said: 
It pleases me to see a young man like you these days when 
our youth have gone so soft. Many young men have come to 
me to ask for yams but I have refused because I know they 
would just dump them in the earth and leave them to be 
chocked by weeds... But I can trust you. I know it as I look 
at you. As our fathers said, you can tell a ripe com by its 
look. I shall give you twice four hundred yams. Go ahead and 
prepare your farm™1. 
It is understood in African ethics that if the individual flourishes, the society also 
flourishes. Okonkwo met his doom when he alienated himself from his clan and failed 
to reason along with them. The African person is a social being and can only survive 
and prosper in the community. 
The kinds of networks of social relationships that are advocated by African ethics can 
be seen more clearly in a number of spheres of social life: namely the extended family 
system, stokvel, consensus, and democracy and ancestors. I examine each of them in 
turn. 
3.3a The Extended Family System. 
This is part of the African way of life. The members of one's family extend beyond 
the western nuclear family. Extended cousins and nieces are normally seen as the 
members of the individual's family. In African society, an individual may have many 
fathers and mothers. 
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In African life, child has many fathers and mothers. The 
brothers of his natural father are also regarded and respected 
as his father and the sisters of his mother are all addressed as 
"Ma' (mother). There are therefore no orphans in traditional 
Africa; if the natural parents of a child die, the other fathers 
and mothers in the extended family automatically take over 
custody of the child*™ 
And in their social relation, they help each other financially and materially. They lend 
and borrow items to and from each other. They also take care of each other's 
properties. 
3.3b. Stokvel. 
This is one of the ways the Africans help each other financially without making profit 
from each other. It can be seen as a kind of social club whereby the members 
contribute certain amounts of money with the sole aim of sharing it among themselves 
after a stipulated period. In some cases, the whole amount is given to a single person 
while other peoples wait for their own turn. Louw has this to say: 
Stokvels are joint undertakings or collective enterprises, such 
as saving clubs, burial societies and other cooperatives. The 
term refers to a wide range of community based financial 
arrangements according to which resources are pooled and 
the again disbursed to members as either (interest-free) loans 
or payouts...Profits are shared on an equal basis. Making a 
profit is important but never if it involves the exploitation of 
others***". 
This stokvel also extends to farm works and agriculture. Gbadegesin writes, " A 
member may call upon the group to help him harvest or plant or clear the weeds. He 
only has to feed the participants and later he may be called upon to helpxxxlv". 
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African society also discourages the individualistic concept of property rights. Teffo 
writes: 
Hence most things are jointly owned by the group, for 
instance there was no such things as individual land 
ownership. The land belonged to the people and was merely 
under the control of the local chief on behalf of the people. 
When cattle went to graze it was on an open veld and not on 
anybody's specific farraxxxv" 
3.3c. Consensus and Democracy. 
Social life and the centrality of relationships in African society are very explicit in the 
way the Africans conduct their meetings. At meetings, everybody is given an 
opportunity to air their view, and decisions are taken after everyone has spoken. This 
method of arriving at consensus is based on the view of humanity that holds that all 
people are equal. Louw says: 
Traditional Africa democracy operates in the form of 
(continuous extremely lengthy) discussion. Although there 
may be hierarchy of importance among the speakers, every 
person gets an equal chance to speak up until some kind of an 
agreement, consensus or group cohesion is reached**™". 
3.3d. Ancestors. 
Traditionally, Africans have a practical relationship with the dead. The ancestors are 
seen as living dead. Although they are dead it is believed that their spirits are still 
alive in the family and the community. During traditional ceremonies and rituals, their 
spirits are invoked to bless the occasion. People entertain them during feasts by 
throwing food or pouring wine on the ground. People also invoke the ancestors 
before embarking on journeys and business endeavours. If they are successful, they 
make thanksgiving offerings to them. An individual who commits evil in the 
community is taken to have disgraced the ancestors. Louw writes: 
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Ancestors are extended family. Dying is an ultimate 
homecoming. Not only the living must therefore share with 
and care for each other, but the living and the dead depend 
on each other. This accords with the daily experience of 
many (traditional) Africans. For example, at a calabash, 
which is an African ritual that involves the drinking of beer, 
a little bit of wine is often poured on the ground for 
consumption of ancestors. And as is probably well known 
(yet often misunderstood), many Africans also belief in God 
through the mediation of ancestors. In Africa societies there 
seems to be inextricable bond between man, ancestors, and 
whatever is regarded as the Supreme Being... xxxv" 
3.4. Explanation of Some of the Values of Ubuntu. 
The African person does not live a flourishing life by only recognizing the 
importance of community in her life and attaching herself to a particular community, 
rather she becomes a fully actualised person that lives a flourishing life by relating 
and living well with others in her community. A good relationship that leads to 
human flourishing in African society is a relationship that is based on the ethic of 
Ubuntu. 
The ethical values and virtues of Ubuntuism are plentiful and 
vary from author to author; but the most frequently 
mentioned are those of solidarity, respect, sharing, loyalty, 
cooperation, participation, caring, humaneness, sympathy and 
empathy^1. 
The individual, as it has been shown in this work, who embodies and practices the 
values of Ubuntu, is a good persoa She is the one who lives a flourishing life in 
African society. These values are lived and practiced in the community; they are 
primarily concerned with human relationships since the individual is defined in 
relationships with others - umuntu ungumuntu ngabantu. 
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Broodryk explains some of these values of Ubuntu in social relationships50™". I shall 
examine each in rum: 
Humanity 
Ubuntu upholds the value of humanity. It is this value that calls the African to treat 
every person as a human being. It is the value that shows that the human person is an 
empathic person who identifies with the problems and sufferings of others. It is 
respect for human dignity. 
Respect 
Respect is an important concept in Ubuntu and it is related to discipline and order. It 
is believed where there is respect there is always unity and progress. Children are 
obligated to respect their parents, young people are expected to respect their elders, 
and followers their leaders. Ubuntu advocates that every person should be respected. 
Thus, parents, elders and leaders should also show respect to others. The living also 
expected to respect the ancestors as they are regarded as the guardians of the family 
and the community. 
Caring 
Caring is an important value in African society. Parents are naturally required to care 
for their children and children to care for their parents in their old age. That is why, in 
African society, there are no old age homes as the aged are cared for by their children. 




Visitors and strangers are often surprised by the way they are received and treated in 
African society. Rems Nna Umashiegbu in his book, The Way We Lived1, said that in 
Ibo society, when there was a visitor, the neighbours would all entertain the visitor in 
turn The wife would go to the host or hostess to bring the visitor to her house. 
Secretly, she would find out what the visitor liked and then prepare that food. When 
the guest arrived, Kola would be served and food brought. It would be a sign of 
disrespect for the visitor to refuse the food. On the other hand, visitors were not 
supposed to finish all the food. They were expected to leave some morsel of it. 
Children who wash plates and dishes would be unhappy if they did not find remnants 
of food on the plates or dish. 
Sharing 
In daily Ubuntu life, assets and food are shared without compensation as if the 
belongings of the individual are also the belongings of the extended family members. 
In African culture, food is always shared together by all those at meetings, funerals, 
or the work place. Sometimes, a bottle of beer may be shared by five or six people, all 
drinking from the bottle. One person will drink and pass on to another until the beer is 
finished. 
The individual who can participate well in society in such way that leads to the 
realisation of personhood in African society is the individual who has acquired all the 
values of Ubuntu, and practices them. It is the responsibility of the family and the 
community at large to see that a child is equipped with these values in order to be able 
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to relate well with others in the community. Children learn quickly through 
observations. The parents and adults should endeavour to set good examples for the 
young ones. If children observe adults being kind, caring and respectful to one 
another, consequently they will learn the importance of those values in realisation of 
their own human flourishing and that of the community. The way the community 
responds to the needs of her members serves to show the young to value the humanity 
of others. 
Any individual in African society that values the humanity of others in the way 
embodied by these values will surely live a flourishing life. Where the values of 
Ubuntu namely humanity, caring, sharing, sympathy, compassion, solidarity and so 
on, permeate the whole community, the children will eventually embody those values 
of Ubuntu. Broodryk writes: 
Love is fundamental to Ubuntu. It is amazing how it reflects 
when children are brought up in atmosphere of love and 
compassion. Children growing up in an atmosphere of love 
are usually children who are also living the (Ubuntu) values 
... they are kind, forgiving, empathic and sympathetic... 
The community also through various initiations and ritual activities instil in the young 
ones, the laws, customs and values that hold the community together: 
Initiation schools are traditional institutions, which may be 
seen as the version of finishing school. Young adults attend 
these schools where they become men and women and 
during these periods they also taught traditional lessons of 
life, cultural norms and values. After attending these schools 
young adults are accepted by adulthood as adults and are 
regarded as ready to engage in marriage.xl" 
These values are meant to help the individual to live and relate well with others in her 
community. It is by living well with others in the community that the individual 
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attains personhood in African society, that is, lives a flourishing life. Thus the kind of 
community that instils the values of Ubuntu in the young and provides them with the 
social conditions for practising these values is the right society for human flourishing. 
3.5. Critical Comparison between Aristotelian Ethics and African Ethics. 
It seems that the notion of the good life in Aristotle's ethics is structurally similar to 
the notion of the good life in African society. The good life is lived and realised in a 
community or social milieu. It is a question of an agent relating well with the other 
members of her community. Both accounts are based on a conception of person that 
is essentially social. It is the community and the family that are essential in the 
formation of ethical character leading to human flourishing. Furthermore, crucially, it 
is only in certain networks of relationships that the individual can practice virtue, or 
the values of Ubuntu, so achieving her telos. 
The Aristotelian individual, through the circle of her virtuous friends, can acquire 
virtues and learn how to act virtuously towards her friends. From acting virtuously 
with her friends she learns too that she is ought to live well with others who are not 
the members of her circle of love. Similarly, the African person through good social 
relationship with her family acquires the Ubuntu values of caring, sharing, respect, 
humanity and so on that will help her to relate well with other members of her 
community who are not the members of her extended family. In the Aristotelian 
account, the friend needs her virtuous friends to enjoy life and express her goodness 
to others. In this same way, the African person needs the extended family and the 
community to live and enjoy life and express her goodness. 
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I have also shown that the realisation of human flourishing is an ongoing process both 
in Aristotelian and African ethics. Human flourishing is an act of living well. The 
individual is continuously challenged to express the virtues, or the values of Ubuntu 
relations with others. 
According to the Aristotelian account, virtuous friends care for one another and 
extend this caring to the whole community because their lives are embedded in the 
life of the community. Similarly, a member of a particular African community cares 
and respects the community because she is part of the community and her life is 
dependent on the community. Thus an individual can flourish in both Aristotle and 
African ethics when the community or society is the kind of society that is required 
for human flourishing: a society that provides social conditions for the flourishing of 
each of the members of the community; a society that does not stifle the individual's 
autonomy and initiatives, but is, indeed, the necessary backdrop for this. As should 
now be evident, the social conditions required for flourishing are established when 
the individual is embedded in a network of the right kind of relationships: 
relationships that embody the virtues, or the values of Ubuntu. 
The aim of formation of ethical character is to enable the individual to be a good 
person; to attain human flourishing. It is the community that forms the individual by 
instilling the virtues or the values of Ubuntu in children. This can only be achieved 
when a good community - a community that values the virtues, or the values of 
Ubuntu - is in place. The community aims to ensure that what the child sees as 
pleasant and useful are acts that accord with virtues, or the values of Ubuntu. 
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Just as the virtues need to be actively exercised in virtuous friendships for individuals 
to achieve flourishing so to do the values of Ubuntu need to be actively exercised for 
individuals to achieve full personhood or live a flourishing life. 
In what follows I examine in detail how the exercise of the values of Ubuntu in 
African social relations is similar to the exercise of virtues in virtuous friendship in 
Aristotelian ethics. This illustrates the crucial role that the right kinds of networks of 
social relations play in achieving human flourishing. 
The Extended family 
The members of extended family normally see themselves as brothers and sisters. 
There is no discrimination amongst them. In other words, they value the humanity of 
each other. Each person sees the other person as herself and loves her as she loves her 
own self; they share in the joy and sorrows of one another. They are ready and willing 
to come to the help of the other. Each is encouraged to respect the other. As they live 
and interact together daily, they learn more about each other and come to cherish their 
unity. 
From this extended family system they come to appreciate and respect the dignity of 
the other members of community who do not belong to their own extended family. 
For, from valuing the humanity of their extended family they acquire the moral 
disposition to treat every other person as their own brother and sister. Moreover, they 
care for their community as their lives are embedded in the community, and because 
some members of the extended family may have friends and colleagues who do not 
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belong to the family and these people's lives directly or indirectly affect the lives of 
the members of the extended family. 
Similarly, according to the Aristotelian account, virtuous persons through their 
virtuous friendships, learn to care for other members of the community: some of them 
may have friends who are outside of their circle of virtuous friendships and yet who 
also indirectly determine the flourishing life of the members of their intimate circle of 
friends. 
Stokvel 
Here, the values of caring and sharing are very prominent. Every member is always 
encouraged to care for the others in the group, and to share what she has with the 
others. It is when money, food, clothing, and sometimes even knowledge about life, is 
shared among themselves that they are bound to experience their friendliness. What 
they gain from the stokvel, they take home to their community to share with those 
who are not members of their club. Just as the virtuous person learns form her 
virtuous friendships that she ought to care for those who are not members of her circle 
of friends, as the outsiders are also the members of the community in which her life is 
played out, so are the benefits of stokvel shared amongst the whole community. 
Consensus and Democracy 
The African process of consensus and democracy can be likened to the expression of 
virtuous friendship in Aristotelian ethics. In African society at meetings everybody is 
given opportunity to her view. This is based on the value of humanity that sees every 
person as being equal. During meetings they discuss social, political, economic and 
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ethical issues, which provide the attendants the opportunity to learn from each other 
about their community. They learn, among other thing, about the things the 
community advocates and abhors, and to assess themselves if they are living in 
harmony with the members of the community and the community at large, and also to 
make amends where these is called for. Broodryk says: 
The Ubuntu norms and values of the community are 
similarly respected since they determine life in that 
community. If one has been offended by a member of the 
community, other extended family members would 
collectively become involved in discussing the offence to 
settle the problem in order to maintain peace and unity*1"1. 
Similarly, the virtuous in their interaction with one another, assess their behaviour to 
ensure that they are still on the track that leads to living a virtuous life. Each person is 
a mirror to the other. 
Ancestors 
Another area of African life where values of Ubuntu are exercised actively is in 
relationship to the ancestors. The living are encouraged and expected daily to respect 
their ancestors. To commit an abomination such as murder is to dishonour the 
ancestors. Being disrespectful of one's parents and elders of the community is 
considered as being disrespectful of the ancestors who are believed to be guiding the 
family and the community. Thus the value, respect, is actively exercised daily as 
people interact and live together with the ancestors. This suggests that the network of 
what can be understood as virtuous relationships in African society, extends to the 
relations between the visible and the invisible worlds. 
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One important difference between Aristotelian ethics and African ethics is that 
Aristotle holds that human beings are first and foremost rational animals. It is this 
rational capacity that necessitates, in a sense, her social relations with others, for it is 
only in social relationships that the individual can pursue her rational activities. 
According to African ethics, however, a person exists immediately in relation to 
others once she is born. She is primarily a social being. Kanyike writes: "It is not 
reason as such that determines human existence, but relation*111"' 
Moreover, the African person exists also in relation with the visible and invisible 
worlds. Through ritual she is reminded of her ancestry and the role the ancestors play 
both in her life and that of the community, and she is taught that to violate communal 
values and customs is to bring disgrace to the ancestors and community. Aristotle, 
however, makes no reference to the role of ancestor in virtuous living. 
Having developed an account of the kind of society required for human flourishing, I 
aim, in the next chapter, to critically examine the radical, postmodern individualism 
prevalent in (mostly western) contemporary societies in order to determine whether 
such individualism can provide the conditions required for the formation of ethical 
character that leads to human flourishing. African society itself is becoming 
individualistic at a very fast pace. Africans came into contact with the western world 
through colonialism. Schooled in the western thought, western individualism has been 
followed by many at the expense of African humanism or Ubuntu. I investigate 
whether this individualistic ethic does or does not foster the conditions for human 
flourishing that Aristotelian and African ethics support. 
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A Critique of Contemporary Individualism 
4.1. Introduction. 
In this chapter, I will use the ideas of communitarians such as Charles Taylor, 
Alisdair Macintyre, Michael Sandel, and Pedro Tabensky, as well as the account 
developed in the previous chapter to critique contemporary postmodern 
individualism. My overarching aim is to show that this contemporary individualistic 
ethic does not create the kind of society required for human flourishing, as it does not 
foster the conditions for formation of ethical character that Aristotle and African 
ethics advocate. I will also argue in this chapter, for a renewal of African moral 
values at the expense of the values of contemporary postmodern individualism. 
4.2. A Critique of Contemporary Individualistic Society 
Whether a society is an individualistic or communitarian depends largely on the 
concept of personhood it holds and entertains. Kwame Gyekye says ".... The type of 
social structure or arrangements evolved by a particular society seems to reflect and 
be influenced by the public conception of personhood held in the society1". Thus a 
society that maintains, for example, an individual psychological criterion for 
personhood or personal identity is likely to be an individualistic society. In such a 
society a person is understood to be a person through her individual psychological 
features. The self becomes viewed as a self-sufficient, atomic individual, who does 
not need to depend on her relationship with others for her personhood. In such 
society, individualism is much stressed and emphasised. It is widely thought that this 
has been the nature of western society since the Enlightenment. 
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Charles Taylor speaks of the influence of Locke on today's understanding of the 
western person: 
The subject of disengagement and rational control has become 
a familiar modern figure. One might almost say it has become 
one way of construing ourselves, which we find it hard to 
shake off. It is one aspect of our inescapable contemporary 
sense of inwardness. As it develops to its full form through 
Locke and the Enlightenment thinkers he influenced, it 
becomes what I want to call the 'punctual' self1. 
Taylor further states "Locke's theory generates and also reflects an ideal of 
independence and self-responsibility, a notion of reason as free from established 
custom and locally dominant authority1"". Rosalind Shaw also notices the movement 
from the communitarian type of society to the present day individualism of the 
western society: 
...an evolutionary trajectory from personne to moi, from a 
relational model of personhood as the exterior acting out of 
social roles to an 'inherent attribute' based on selfhood in 
terms of an interior psychological essence. This trajectory, 
more over, is viewed as a movement from socially 
"constrained" agency to political "freedom". And "freedom" 
finally is understood in terms of the Rights of man - rights that 
are themselves largely defined in terms of the absence of 
social constraints upon individual agency™. 
Shaw further states: 
... in both the United States and Britain today, the language of 
"freedom of speech", "freedom of choice", "individual 
opportunity", "the individual right to privacy", etc, is central 
to nationalist self- constructions as optimal societies for 
'individuals'- and "individuals" are thereby defined in terms 
of their capacity for autonomous actions.v 
Alisdair Macintyre describing this idea of individualism says: 
... From this standpoint of individualism I am what I myself 
choose to be. I can always, if I wish to, put in question what 
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are taken to be the merely contingent social features of my 
existence. I may be biologically be my father's son; but I 
cannot be held responsible for what he did unless I choose 
implicitly or explicitly to assume such responsibility..." 
Thus, according to individualism, the individual is the only architect of her life. 
Objective values, community and traditions have no place in individualism, unless the 
individual chooses it to be so. Furthermore, the state exists with the sole aim of 
providing the individual with freedom. According to individualism, everything is 
contingent. Our hopes, desires, language, our conscience, community, and our 
solidarity are all contingent by-products of chance and time. 
Though a person is considered to be an individual in atomistic sense, this does not 
imply that she cannot relate socially. According to individualism, she maintains social 
relationships but always remains autonomous. The goals of the society need not be 
her own goals for she has the freedom to remake the goals of the society to suit her. 
Society is there to respect her rights, while she remains autonomous of the authority 
of her clan or nation. 
The rise of individualism in western society can be linked to the rise of democracy. 
Nivedita Menon tracing the history of democracy in his article The Rise of 
Democracy"1, says that historically the rise of democracy has been intrinsically linked 
to the growth of capitalism. He argues that modern democratic ideas grew initially in 
order to nurture the growth of capitalism. He maintains too that the key notion of the 
individual, invested with rights to her body and property emerged at this time, 
replacing the idea of the self as an extension of the community. 
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African society, as I mentioned above, has and is embracing individualism to a large 
extent. A.T. Dalfovo maintains that: 
African culture has always had the communal dimension of 
life and ethics as a strong and healthy asset. Today, however, 
one needs to reckon with an intensive and relentless influence 
of individualism brought about by contemporary social change 
emerging, for instance, in urban life, job competition, 
economic management and privatisation policies../'" 
Preston Chitere, commenting on the influence of western civilisation on African 
community, says: 
The effects of capitalism are already being felt in our families. 
Individualism in society is increasing. Even families in rural 
areas like to operate in isolation, and those who offer any help 
are keen to help their immediate families only. The (conjugal) 
family is becoming more independent. The loss of community 
networks and the development of individualism have resulted 
in (increased occurrences of) suicide, loneliness, drug abuse 
and mental illness. The communal system is breaking dowa 
The extended family had certain functions to perform, for 
instance, to reconcile couples at loggerheads with each other, 
but this is no longer the case. It is no one (else's) business to 
know what is happening in one's marriage today^. 
Thus, the traditional African family structure is breaking up due to rapid social 
change. John Lawson Degbey says that under these conditions it is failing to fulfil its 
primary role of socialisation. In the urban centres we see a nuclear family system 
growing rapidly at the expense of the extended family system It is now a matter of 
the individual's life, her house, her flat her possessions, and no longer a matter of the 
traditional usage of our farm, our home, sharing all happiness, woes, successes of the 
extended family loyalty and being responsible to one's eldersx. 
Contemporary individualism has attracted many criticisms from communitarians such 
as Charles Taylor, Alsdair Macintyre, Michael Sandel and Pedro Tabensky because. 
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in keeping with Aristotelian and African ethics, these theorists believe that the self is 
essentially social and that, consequently, individualism does not provide a proper 
moral framework for the flourishing of human beings. 
For the postmodern individual, the most radical strand of individualism, absolutely 
everything about herself is contingent. Communal or social ties are external to 
herself, as are values, to be picked up or discarded at will. It is my claim that such a 
view of the individual cannot possibly provide the conditions necessary for human 
flourishing. As discussed above, these conditions are primarily social and consist 
primarily in the individual being embedded in a network of the right sort of 
relationships to others. 
In Nicholas Smith's book, Strong Hermeneutics: Contingency and Moral Identity*', 
Taylor claims that a person is a being for whom things matter. So, in attempting to 
understand the actions of a person, one must take into account interpretations of what 
matters for the persoa The identity of a person is particularly dependent on self -
interpretations. For Taylor, we are selves only because certain things matter to us. 
Interpretation serves to disclose what these things are. Not every thing matters. What 
matters for a person is good life not a mere life, worthwhile not worthless, significant 
not trivial. The identity of a person is intelligible in virtue of their capacity to make 
such distinctions. The things that make the life of a person or group of persons 
worthwhile, significant and fulfilling is that which defines the good life for that 
individual or group. Taylor gives three different strata to the good life otherwise 
identified as three axes of moral intuitions or moral thinking. 
1) A good life will be meaningful and fulfilling 
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2) A course of life can possess various degrees of dignity; a life lacking 
dignity lacks goodness. 
3) Individuals have obligations to others. 
The good is a kind of interpretation Taylor calls strong evaluation. Most often, objects 
are evaluated and choices are made on the basis of what a person happens to desire. 
Strong evaluation employs qualitative distinctions concerning the worth of alternative 
desires, and indeed alternative courses of action and way of living. This evaluative 
framework guides the way we think, act and feel; and this framework is implicitly or 
explicitly expressed in our moral conduct and reactions. The measure of evaluation in 
such cases is not a mere preference, but an independent standard of worth against 
which the values of de facto desire satisfaction are questioned. 
For Taylor, a person's sense of self and identity is conceptually tied to strong 
evaluation. He holds that since a person is a being for whom things matter, a 
particular person's identity is what particularly matters for that person. I am 
specifically this person rather than the other because I take this kind of life to be 
fulfilling and that kind of life to be empty, or because I interpret this course of action 
as right and that action wrong. In answering these questions about identity, Taylor 
says the individual is forced to take a stand in the space provided by a framework of 
strong evaluatioa Thus strong evaluation for Taylor is a criterion of personhood. A 
self-identity that is formed against a background of strong evaluation is non-
contingent in that desires stand measurable against an independent source of worth. 
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Taylor holds that doing without such a framework is utterly impossible, for the 
horizons within which we live our life and which give them meaning must include 
these strong qualitative distinctions or horizon of significance. This horizon is 
independent of one's background or culture: in other words it is universal, categorical 
and ontological. To be without this sense of orientation, which the strong evaluation 
provides, is to have an identity crisis. To suffer an identity crisis is to be incapable of 
answering why a life should be lived one way rather than other. A person who fails to 
answer this question suffers a kind of acute disorientation or emptiness. For Taylor, a 
person who loses orientation to her horizon of significance loses all resources for 
answering the question 'Who am F? 
Taylor, elsewhere™, argues that the self is not independent of the moral obligations of 
the group that she finds herself in. The group's expectation and values help the self 
determine what is valuable, good and worth having or doing. In this way the group, or 
the community, gives the self frameworks to evaluate her actions. Taylor sees the self 
as social in another way: by the words the self uses for self-interpretation. The words 
the self uses in describing and interpreting her actions, feelings, desires and situations 
are interrelated and interdependent. Each has meaning or significance in relation to 
other words. For Taylor, this important relationship between the words the self uses in 
her self-interpretation entails an equally essential relation between the self and other 
selves in the community. 
Taylor has two reasons for holding this view. The first reason is that for the self to be 
able perform self-interpretations she must have access to a vocabulary that embodies 
them, and for Taylor a language is only meaningful in a language community; 
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amongst those who have access to and understand the vocabulary. The second reason 
is that the answer to the question 'Who am I?' can only be found in my relations to 
other selves, by establishing where I speak from in the family tree, in social space, in 
my intimate relations to my loved ones. Thus one is a self amongst others. This 
relationship between the self and other selves determines partly the identity of the 
self. 
On Macintyre's Aristotelian view, known as the narrative view"1", the self shares a 
history with others. The story of a self s life is part of the stories of others and their 
own stories are part of her own story. In this community of story telling people, the 
self is educated about virtues, which help the members of the community to seek the 
communal good. This communal good is the good life for human beings. The self qua 
individual will not be able to seek the human good or exercise the Aristotelian virtues 
alone. The self with other selves has got a certain telos; a goal to which they all aim. 
As a member of the community what is good for the self has to be good for the others 
who inhabit the community. The rightful expectations and obligations of the 
community become the expectations and obligations of the self 
For Michael Sanded, the self is social in the sense that she is not independent of her 
constitutive attachments. Constitutive attachments here imply the family, clan or 
community. The self s responsibilities and commitment to her attachments and those 
attachment's responsibilities to the self make up the self s history. This history gives 
the self a character. It is her history that influences her choices and conducts. The self 
as social bears a lot of moral responsibilities towards herself and her constitutive 
attachments. As the self is capable of, she is capable of self-knowledge, which arises 
92 
from reflecting about her moral obligations and responsibilities the self shares the 
same constitutive attachments with the other selves she is capable of forming 
friendships. 
These communitarian theorists can be read as echoing the communitarian accounts 
discussed in the previous three chapters. Communitarians argue that contemporary 
individualism overlooks the fact that human beings are naturally communal in nature. 
Because individualism fails to underscore this fact, it makes it problematic for the 
realisation of the human good, which is communal in content. For communitarians, 
the human good cannot be realised in a society whereby the self is individuated, and 
autonomous from her end and the choices that she makes. They hold that human good 
is only possible in the community or society where the self is attached to her aims and 
ends, and exists in a certain networks of social relationships. It is within communal 
frameworks, they argue, that morality is rational and meaningful, for, it is within such 
frameworks that the obligations and goals of the community become the goals of its 
citizens. 
Sandel would say that the individuated self is incapable of character, friendship, and 
self-knowledge. She is incapable because she does not have any constitutive 
attachments. That this attachment does situate us in relationship with others and make 
us have commitments to them, which in turn define our character and gives us self-
knowledge. According to Macintyre and Sandel, individualism relies on the idea that 
individuals are atomistic, independent of and prior to the society. Society is an aim or 
end, which the people can decide to choose or not. Thus, when individuated or 
'unencumbered' selves choose to form a society, their society is a sort of mutual 
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cooperation without any strong bond between the members. They are only members 
of the society because of the advantages they derive from it. The communitarians 
argue that in the society of individuated selves, there is no unity of life because there 
is no common goal uniting the people, since any unencumbered self is free to choose 
her own means to arrive at her own ends. According to Macintyre, the world of 
unencumbered, individuated selves does not provide the framework necessary for the 
practise of Aristotelian virtues: 
For a self separated from itself in the Satrian mode loses that 
arena of social relationship in which Aristotelian virtues 
function if they function at all...at the same time the 
liquidation of the self into a set of demarcated areas of role 
playing allows no scope for the exercise of dispositions which 
could be genuinely be accounted virtues in any sense remotely 
Aristotelian'". 
And Taylor says: 
... any adequate conception of morality, of the self and its 
narrative unity, and of practical reasoning must acknowledge 
the foundational importance of moral frameworks or 
qualitative distinctions; and all such frameworks are 
essentially communal in nature: they can be established, 
maintained and acquired only through the membership of a 
language community™. 
As I mentioned earlier, one of the strata of good life, according to Taylor, is that the 
individual has obligations to others. Strong evaluation makes the individual aware of 
her autonomy and the communal characteristics of her existence. Thus morality is 
understood in the context of the community. This is not the case, however, according 
to radical, postmodern individualism where morality is subjected to the whims and 
caprices of the individual. Macintyre, who uses the term 'emotivist self for the 
contemporary person, says in regard to individualistic ethic, "...the emotivist self and 
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the corresponding decline of moral debate into the conflict of arbitrary personal wills 
first became definitively established during the Enlightenment™"' 
Pedro Tabensky commenting on Macintyre's view of the emotivist self writes: 
I might further add to the detriment of a sense of our common 
essence - our common purpose. And I might also add that uie 
lack of a sense that we have a common essence is not 
surprisingly, linked to the fact that the cotemporary subject is 
archetypically one that tends towards moral emptiness. 
Macintyre's critique of the modem democratised self parallels 
my critique of the contemporary self - the self who dwells in 
what could be characterized as the age of consumption... 
Macintyre's critique of the democratized self- the sort of self-
fostered by contemporary consumption-driven neo-liberal 
democracies - is based on a critique of what he refers to as 
'emotivism'. Macintyre defines emotivism as the thesis that 
states that all moral judgements are nothing but expressions of 
preference, expressions of attitudes or feelings...'.It is not 
hard to see why this characterization of emotivism ties in very 
neatly with the moral bankruptcy of the contemporary subject. 
If, indeed, one embodies emotivism - the sort of ethic 
embodied in neo - liberal communities - the there is ultimately 
no reason, except the whimsical reason that this is simply 
what one desires, to behave in one way rather than in another, 
for there is little sense that life has a direction'"1". 
In this kind of society where every body does and acts as she likes and deems fit, as 
there is no communal evaluative framework, exploitation of others is likely. The 
contemporary individualistic society is a kind of society that encourages the idea of 
survival of the fittest. The weak are exploited, marginalized and disfranchised. 
People are discriminated against because of their race, colour and gender. Everybody 
attempts to use her fellow human beings in order to obtain unlimited freedom and 
independence. Society is seen not as guaranty for safety or social welfare, but as a 
means to make as much money as possible. Tabensky says: 
There are many other types of relationship in which engage 
daily that undermine the humanity of our fellow humans. I am 
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thinking of male attitudes towards women (which is exploited 
to great effect by Hollywood, and the tabloid press), of the 
attitude of transnational corporations in their relentless pursuit 
of cheap labour in Asia (in particular), of the way in which we 
engage with providers of goods and services, of the manner in 
which dominant groups typically treat disadvantaged minority 
groups... However, there is a general reason why such 
exploitative practices are fostered - namely, that the pluralism 
embodied in contemporary neo- liberal democracies is 
radically individualistic. The ethos embodied is one that blinds 
people to one of the fundamental conditions of individuality-
our radical interconnectedness^. 
The idea of postmodern individualism does not, then, support the idea of 
communitarian common welfare. In the individualistic society, every individual is 
expected to cater for her own needs, and sometimes the needs of her nuclear family. 
One then wonders who will carter for the needs of the disabled or dependent who do 
not fit the model of the autonomous individual? 
It is the virtues, and the values of Ubuntu that make truly people consider and care for 
the needs of every human person. We cannot build the kind of society required for 
human flourishing, the kind of society that will help us to be virtuous, if we cannot 
respond to the needs some people have due to factors beyond their control. 
To return to a point made earlier, Degbey says in his article, Africa Family 
Structure**, that the traditional African society has also come under the influence of 
individualism which has not only transformed the society's orientation but also has 
distorted the social system. He contends too that the traditional family structure under 
pressure from rapid social change is undergoing erosion, and is splitting to such an 
extent that it is failing to fulfil its primary role of socialisation. In the modern era, he 
says, family has gradually shrunk to become the nuclear family, consisting only of 
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parents and their children, thus denying the parents the help they once received from 
extended family support networks. As a consequence, many parents find it extremely 
difficult to carry out all their work and family responsibilities. 
Degbey says the situation has become worse in our contemporary period due to the 
fact that the stability of marriage has been seriously threatened. Marriage has 
gradually become the individual's concern rather than a business of two families who 
give their daughter or son respectively and support the marriage through counselling 
and financial assistance. Lack of active involvement of extended family in marriage 
today has its consequences: The divorce rate has risen sharply and the number of 
single parents has increased dramatically, says Degbey. The children of these broken 
homes suffer. Many children of broken homes today end up in the street to earn a 
living. Street life, with its freedom, and lack of family control is not without its 
repercussions; the end result is that our society is filled with individuals without 
morals, tribal mores or traditions. Degbey claims that unwanted pregnancies and 
abortion, among girls, become the order of the day. Others may attracted to early 
marriages and others may take to prostitution thereby standing at a high risk of 
contracting HTV7AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. 
The good life for human beings, as I argued in the previous chapter, can only be 
realised in a community. Contemporary individualistic society does not foster the 
conditions for human flourishing that African and Aristotle ethics advocate. As it has 
been shown earlier, human flourishing is only possible when the individual practises 
the virtues, or the values of Ubuntu. The virtues, or the values of Ubuntu are only 
intelligible in social engagements; it is social engagements that the individual is 
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challenged to express her goodness to others. When the individual expresses her 
goodness to others by living well with them she achieves human flourishing. Good 
character formation can be achieved only in a community where the agent is trained 
and encouraged to practise the virtues, or the values of Ubuntu. 
However, we are not yet condemned to a completely dehumanising and selfish 
society. This is explicit in the formation of European Union and existence of certain 
charitable organisations. The countries of Europe are coming together to form a 
united community. It has been argued by many that main aim of European union is 
for economic and commercial gains and not a communal life. An unidentified writer 
says: 
It is significant that the politicians are organizing a united 
Europe whereas there is a complete failing of social unity and 
justice. For the people there are no possibilities to develop 
themselves as individualists. Since united Europe will be 
organized as a commercial enterprise ordinary people only 
count as inevitable expenses. Of course, one tries to make 
those expenses as low as possible. And there is no interest in 
creating conditions for individual development except when 
there should be a need for educated employees for the 
business. But such individuality is limited to a prescribed form 
of behaviour. It is but a cosmetic individuality™ 
I claim that no matter how they view the European union, the union is directly or 
indirectly aimed at providing a flourishing life for Europeans. I hope to have shown 
that human flourishing can only be realised or reached in communal living whereby 
the adults and the community instill Aristotelian virtues and the values of Ubuntu in 
the children by being virtuous themselves. 
As I mentioned above, the western world is taking greater interest than ever before in 
African society. Today, Koffi Annan is carrying the whole world on his shoulders as 
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the secretary general of United Nations. In 2010, the whole world is coming to the 
African continent for the first time to watch the soccer world cup. The world is in 
many ways becoming one global community. 
The traditional African society has got a lot to offer to the world for the global village 
to become a reality. It has to offer to the world its communal values based on Ubuntu. 
Ubuntu, the African ethic, means total respect for the humanness of other persons. It 
is the ethical value that teaches the individual that the other person is her brother or 
sister regardless of her colour or creed. African ethics, just like Aristotelian ethics, is 
based on the concept of human nature; a conception of human nature that shows that 
human being is essentially social and rational. African ethics is in accord with our 
human nature and it has the solution to the unjust and dehumanising world of 
individualism. If values of Ubuntu were to be put into practise by every one we shall 
all live a life that is truly flourishing. Hence Africans should be proud of their values, 
and not allow them to be undermined by the individualistic postmodernist life. N. B. 
Pityana says: 
The cause of Africa is never going to be served by prevailing 
moral relativism and selectivity. There must be some 
common, shared and abiding values that bind us together for 
all time. The mark of a great people is their capacity to wrestle 
with the moral challenges of their time and lay the foundations 
of the good society for this and future generations. We are at 
our most human when we display moral sensitivity. That is the 
mark of ubuntu; the creed that has held many Africans to an 
ideal that affirms one's humanity as being tied up with the 
humanity of others. The greatest gift we can bequeath to 
future generations to a world that is more not less human, 
more caring and more loving™'. 
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L. Teffo gives a very deep insight into the link between moral renewal and African 
renaissance, which also brings into prominent of dynamism of African moral values. I 
will quote him at length: 
The African renaissance is an invitation to Africans - those on 
the continent and in the diaspora- to redefine themselves and 
take their destiny into their own hands... where lies the anchor 
of this African renaissance? Arguably it lies in moral renewal 
through African values. Politics and economics undoubtedly 
have a role to play, however, without a moral conscience, 
society is soulless. I recommend that we resuscitate the moral 
fibre of the family. The family unit is the foundation of 
society. Let us as parents live according to those norms and 
values we hold dear in our hearts, however demanding that 
might be. Let us inculcate those values in our children from a 
tender age. Let us remain mindful of the Kikuyu expression 
that it takes the whole village to raise a child. Let us introduce 
the study of the philosophy of ubuntu/botho, menslikkheid or 
humanness in religious studies, ethics, applied ethics, 
jurisprudence, and so forth. Let us support all initiatives by 
civil society to renew morality. Let us be true to ourselves and 
our culture... The existence of premodern, modern and 
postmodern discourse already illustrates the availability of 
alternative ways of structuring human experience. Morality 
implies respect for others. The respect for the other is partly 
based on the fact that the relationship exposes contingency in 
the being of both. With one communal or national effort 
taking a leaf from the traditional values encapsulated in 
African humanism, we can generate a unifying force that can 
enable us to transcend the stereotypes of yesteryear. In 
ubuntu/botho we can draw sustenance from our diversity, 
honouring our rich and varied traditions and cultures, and act 
together for the development, protection and benefit of us all. 
This philosophy recognises the indivisibility of human nature, 
and the commonness of purpose of human beings which make 
our interests, aspirations and objective intertwined. It believes 
in the totality of human effort and a holistic involvement in 
the quest for love and peace in the family of man, in the 
universal order of things5™". 
For our society to be a good a kind of society required for human flourishing, it 
should be organised and structured along the lines made explicit by Aristotelian and 
African ethics. Contemporary individualism cannot provide us with these conditions 
for human flourishing, as I have argued above. African communal values are the 
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solution to the selfish and individualistic society that encourages inequality and 
oppression. It is high time Africans, and others appreciate the values of Ubuntu and 
make a serious effort to live them out in their daily lives. 
101 
ENDNOTES. 
1 Kwame Gyekye, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought. The Akan Conceptual 
Scheme. (New York: Cambridge University Press 1987), p.317 
" C. Taylor, Sources of the self. The Making of the Modern Identity. ( USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 160 
Ui Ibid, p. 167 
" R Shaw, "Tok Af, Lef Af. " A Political Economy of Temne Techniques of Secrecy 
and Self, In I. Karp and D.A. Masolo (eds.), African Philosophy As Cultural Inquiry. 
(USA: Indiana University Press, 2000), p.27 
v Ibid, 
" A. Macintyre, "The Virtues and the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a 
Tradition", In M. Sandel (ed.) Liberalism and its Critics, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1984), p. 142 
*" N. Menon, The Rise of Democracy, 
http://www.hinduomnet.com/folio/fo0001/00010220.htm, p.2 
"" A.T.Dalfovo, Applied Ethics and The Experiential Dimension in Africa 
Philosophy, http://mvAV.crvp.Org/book/Series02/l 1-8/chater i.htm 
a J. E. Lassiter, African Culture and Personality: Bad Social Science, Effective Social 
Activism, Or A Call To Reinvent Ethnology, 
http//web.Afiicaufl.edu/asq/v3/v3i3al.htm, p. 8 
x J.l.Degbey, Africa Family Structure, http://www:jicef.or. jp /wahec/ful 217:htm 
30 N.H. Smith, Strong Hermeneutics: Contingency and Moral Identity, (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1997), pp.36-38 
* C.Taylor, "The Sources of Self In S.Muhall and A. Swift, Liberals and 
Communitarians, (USA: Maiden Mass, 1992), pp. 111-113 
xiii A. Macintyre, Op.cit, pp 143-147 
** M.Sandels, "Justice and the Good'" In M.Sandel (ed.) Liberalism and its Critics, 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp.156-176 
w A. Macintyre, Op,cit, p. 126 
^C. Taylor, Op.cit, p. 121 
^'A. Macintyre, "Morality after Virtue", In S. Muhall and A. Swift, Liberals and 
Communitarians, (USA: Maiden Mass, 1984), p.77 
XVU1 P. Tabensky, Happiness, Personhod, Community, Purpose, (USA: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2003), pp 180-181 
™ Ibid, p. 180 
305 J.L.Degbey, Op.aY, pp.4-6 
™ A Reflection On Individualism, http://home.\vxs.nl/-rilosvis/art-02.htm, p.5 
XXil N. B. Pityana, World council of churches: Eight Assembly, Plenary: Ubuntu and 
the African Kairos, http://\vAVAv.wcc-coe.org/\vcc/assemblv/afrip-e.html, p.4 
xxm L. Teffo, "Moral Renewal and African experience(s)", In W.Makgoba (ed.) 
African Renaissance,(Cape Town: Mafube Publishers, 1999), ppl 68-169 
102 
CONCLUSION 
I have discussed, in this research, two accounts that attempt to determine the right 
way to live so that we can attain human flourishing, or eudaimonia I have shown that 
there are significant similarities between these two accounts. Considering the two 
together can give us useful insight into the kind of society, or networks of 
relationships, that are required for the formation of ethical character, and thus for 
human flourishing. Furthermore I have shown that the ideals of individualism, 
particularly postmodern individualism, cannot hope to achieve the kind of society 
required for human flourishing, as such individualist accounts ignore the essentially 
social nature of both human beings and the good human life. 
Aristotle bases his account of eudaimonia on account of human nature. He argues that 
man has a function, which is the capacity to reason, and it is this function that 
differentiates man from other animals. It is the thing that makes man what he is. He 
continues to argue that where a thing has a function, a good member of that kind is 
one that fully performs that function. Thus if the function of a sculptor is to sculpt 
statues, a good sculptor is one who sculpts statues properly. As the function of man is 
to actively exercise reason, human flourishing is achieved by an individual who 
actively exercises reason properly, argues Aristotle. 
Crucially, Aristotle argues as essentially social beings, our capacity to reason can 
only be developed in society and, furthermore, the proper exercise of reason can only 
be developed in the right kind of society. A society is good when it advances the telos 
of ethical life of its members, which is eudaimonia Aristotle holds that as persons are 
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naturally social, it is thus necessary and good for us to live in a society. Aristotle's 
strong stance on our essentially social nature is very explicit in his ideas about 
friendship. Friendship, especially virtuous friendships between human beings, is a 
necessary condition for the attainment of eudaimonia, he argues. Thus, social life in a 
community structured around networks of virtuous friendships is a necessary 
condition for our complete flourishing as a human being. A virtuous person cannot be 
virtuous or live virtuously unless she lives in a certain kind of relationship with and to 
others. It is by living with others, that is, in a virtuous community that the individual 
can become good and express her goodness to others. 
Aristotle encourages every individual to develop virtues or dispositions that lead to 
living a good life. Virtues are those capacities or dispositions of character that enable 
us to understand any situations we might find ourselves in and react rationally and 
positively to those situations in order to avoid extremes and excesses so as to live a 
life that is worthy of us as humans. The virtues enable us to perform our function 
well. 
The formation of ethical character is the process by which individuals become 
virtuous, or become fully rational in the Aristotelian sense. The formation of ethical 
character, because of our essentially social nature, is developed by upbringing in the 
right kind of society. Aristotle holds that virtues do not arise by nature; they cannot 
come about unless others train the agent, and the agent practises virtue. In other 
words, virtues are acquired by teaching and habituation. This attests to the 
communitarian nature of the individual and reflects the fact that human beings 
flourish in a community. When an individual becomes virtuous through doing good 
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continuously she starts to take pleasure in moral actions and choices thereby 
experiencing human flourishing that is eudaimonia 
Like Aristotelian ethics, African ethics is based on a particular account of the nature 
of persons. The African worldview comprises both the visible and invisible worlds 
and both worlds interact and relate, and are meaningful through the African person. 
The African person is defined in relation to these worlds and the other human beings 
around her. Today, the conception of person in Africa is enshrined in this Xhosa 
proverb "Muntu ungumuntu ngababntu" meaning "a person is a person through 
persons". The African worldview tells us that a person is a social being by nature and 
she can only succeed and survive in a community. Thus African ethics, which can be 
called Ubuntu, is only lived and realised in a social setting or community. There is no 
place for radical individualism in traditional African ethics. Ubuntu entails the values 
of humanity, caring, sharing, respect, love, kindness and compassion that ensure a 
happy and qualitative community life in a spirit of family. 
A good person or a person of good character in African ethics is the one who 
embodies and practices all the values of Ubuntu in her community for her well being 
and that of her community. There is a kind of symbiotic relationship between the 
individual and community. Each member of the community stands in relationship to 
other members and they are united by one common goal, that is, the progress of the 
community and human flourishing of each other. The individual is given every 
encouragement to thrive and be what she wants to be. And a good community is the 
one that allows its members to express their talents and potentialities. And the 
individual always try not to bring disgrace to her community. She tries in her 
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endeavours to contribute to the progress and welfare of the community. In African 
community childrearing or training is a communal responsibility. It is only when 
there is cooperation in the society that the society becomes the kind that is required 
for human flourishing 
I hope to have shown that the notion of good life in Aristotle's ethics is structurally 
similar to the notion of good life in African society. The good life is a question of the 
individual relating well with the other members of her community. Both are based on 
a conception of person that is essentially social. A life in the community is a life of 
dialogue. It is the community and family that are essential in the formation of ethical 
character leading to human flourish. I hope to have shown that an individual can only 
have flourishing life if her upbringing is within in the right kind of society. Crucial to 
this upbringing, is that the individual be embedded in certain networks of social 
relationships, particularly virtuous friendships. 
I hope to have shown too that the social relationships in African ethics mirror the 
eudaimon, or virtuous friendship in Aristotelian ethics. African ethics, like 
Aristotelian ethics, does not explicitly talk about human rights. African ethics like 
Aristotelian ethics holds that if the values and virtues are operational they guarantee 
respect and dignity for the individual since a life lived in the right kind of society is a 
life that makes for human individual flourishing. I hope to have shown that African 
values can be explicated and understood with reference to the ideas of one of the 
greatest philosophers that ever lived. Thus, the great wealth of literature and research 
in Aristotelian ethics can be useful in understanding and adding to the growing 
research in African ethics. 
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After developing an account of the kind of society required for human flourishing, I 
examined contemporary individualism that prevalent both in the Western and African 
societies. Following philosophers like Charles Taylor, Alisdair Macintyre, Michael 
Sandel and Pedro Tabensky, I argued that the kinds of social relations prevalent in 
these contemporary individualistic societies are not the kinds of social relations 
necessary for the formation of ethical character and human flourishing. I reached the 
conclusion that this individualistic ethic does not foster the conditions for human 
flourishing that Aristotelian and African ethics support and that the contemporary 
individualistic societies do not provide the conditions required for the formation of 
ethical character that leads to human flourishing. Thus, today, one cannot become 
virtuous or good person in the traditional African or Aristotelian sense as present day 
society is individualistic rather than communitarian. 
I have argued also that the Africans should be proud of their humanity and their 
values, and that these values are in accord with human nature. I hope that my research 
will contribute to the African Renaissance as I have argued for a renewal of African 
moral values. The contemporary contact with western democratic societies should not 
influence Africans to lose their African values. The kind of society required for 
human flourishing is far removed from the rampant individualism and power hunger 
evident in contemporary postmodern democratic society. Moreover, as the world is in 
many ways becoming one global village one possible avenue for future research is to 
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